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ABSTRACT
AUDIT FIRM ROTATION, AUDIT FIRM TENURE, AND AUDIT COMMITTEE
SUPPORT IN ACCOUNTING DISPUTES
By
Janice E. Rummell
Since the late 1990s, U.S. regulators have sought to increase auditors’
independence from management and to reduce the presumed detrimental effects of
economic bonding on public company financial reporting. Implementation of mandatory
audit firm rotation that limits auditor tenure to reduce potential independence impairment
has been discussed in the U.S. and other jurisdictions, and adopted in some non-U.S.
jurisdictions. While audit firm rotation is expected to increase auditor independence, the
opponents of mandatory rotation cite decreasing auditor expertise as a significant
counter-argument. This independence/expertise trade-off is integral to much of the
academic discussion of mandatory audit firm rotation.
The audit committee of the board of directors has received increased attention and
a strengthening of its role in enhancing auditor independence during this same regulatory
period. In this study, I bring auditor independence/expertise issues before public
company audit committee members in an accounting dispute resolution setting. In a 2x2
experimental study with 109 public company audit committee member participants, audit
firm tenure (long/short) and audit firm rotation (required/not required) were manipulated
randomly between subjects, and the participants’ level of support for the audit firm or
management in a subjective issue accounting dispute was assessed. Employing the
v

auditor reliability framework (Taylor, DeZoort, Munn, & Thomas, 2003; DeZoort, Holt,
& Taylor, 2012), MANCOVA and ANCOVA analyses were used to test the relationship
between the independent variables audit firm tenure and rotation, and the audit committee
member participants’ assessment of audit firm characteristics and support for the auditor.
Covariates for CPA status, years of management experience, and years of audit
committee experience were included in the models.
The primary results indicate that the long audit firm tenure group assessed audit
firm reliability higher than the short audit firm tenure group. Participants also believed
that the typical audit committee member would be more supportive of longer tenured
auditors. When controlling for social desirability bias, the long tenure group provided
more support for the audit firm proposed adjustment than the short tenure group.
Participants with more years of audit committee experience were more supportive of the
audit firm. The required rotation group assessed audit firm expertise higher than the no
rotation group. A marginally significant interaction between audit firm tenure and
rotation resulted in the short tenure group assessing audit firm independence higher when
rotation was required, than when rotation was not required. The hypotheses predicting
differences in responses for objectivity, reliability, and support based on audit firm
rotation (required or not required) are not supported. CPA status is associated with
increased assessments of audit firm expertise, independence, and objectivity, with CPAs
having higher perceptions of these audit firm characteristics than non-CPAs. Comments
from participants provide insight into the judgment and decision making process for
public company audit committee members.
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This study contributes to the academic literature on mandatory audit firm rotation,
audit firm tenure, audit committee processes, and the auditor reliability framework. It
also informs the public policy debate on audit firm independence and tenure, and has
practical implications for audit committees and stakeholders of public companies.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Public company audit failures through the 1990s and early 2000s, including the
well-publicized audit failures at Enron and WorldCom, have led to regulatory changes
designed to promote higher audit quality and restore investor confidence in the financial
reporting of public companies. One objective of the regulation in the United States was to
maintain higher levels of external auditor independence from client management. The
auditor independence theme is drawn primarily from agency theory (Fama and Jensen
1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976), viewing the independent auditor as a tool for board of
director monitoring of management on behalf of the shareholders. One primary concern
is the financial dependence of the auditor on the client firm—economic bonding—that
can lead to reduced audit firm independence and objectivity. A lack of auditor
independence was blamed for many financial reporting and auditing failures by the
investing public and popular press. A lack of auditor independence is believed to lead to
less objective and less reliable audits, and ultimately lower quality (i.e., less reliable)
financial statements.
The detrimental effects of economic bonding presumably increase as auditor
tenure with the client increases (Casterella & Johnston, 2013). Mandatory audit firm
rotation, requiring firms to engage a different audit firm after a prescribed number of
years (often 5, 7, or 10 years), has been promoted as a means of addressing the loss of
audit quality that some critics believe occurs with extended audit firm tenure with a client
(Gramling, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2010; Roush, Church, Jenkins, McCracken, & Stanley,
1
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2011). Mandatory audit firm rotation is purported to increase auditor independence by
lessening the economic pressure management can exert on the auditor to settle
auditor/management disputes over auditor proposed adjustments in a manner preferred by
management (Arel, Brody, & Pany, 2006; Brown & Wright, 2008; Dopuch, King, &
Schwartz, 2001).
A suggested trade-off of audit firm rotation, though, is the loss of auditors’ clientspecific expertise that develops over extended auditor tenure (Casterella & Johnston,
2013). Impairment of tenure-related auditor expertise, and more audits performed by low
tenure auditors, has the potential to outweigh the audit quality gains from the enhanced
auditor independence that mandatory audit firm rotation is expected to provide (Johnson,
Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002). The contribution that experience and expertise from an
extended audit firm tenure can make toward promoting a high quality audit is the basis
for an argument often cited in opposition to mandatory audit firm rotation (Casterella &
Johnston, 2013; Lim & Tan, 2010; Stefaniak, Robertson, & Houston, 2009).
Carcello & Nagy (2004) find that fraudulent financial reporting is most likely to
occur in the first three years of an engagement. Johnson et al. (2002) find that financial
reporting quality, measured by discretionary accruals, is at its lowest in the first three
years of auditor tenure. Mandatory audit firm rotation would result in more audits being
conducted by auditors in the early years of client tenure when the auditor’s client specific
knowledge, and ability to withstand management pressure based on auditor expertise and
experience, are likely to be at their lowest. Thus, audit firm rotation seems to promote
auditor independence, but likely at the cost of reduced auditor expertise. The
independence/expertise trade-off is integral to much of the academic discussion of
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mandatory audit firm rotation (e.g., Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008;
Hoyle, 1978).
Mandatory audit firm rotation was discussed in the U.S. during the regulatory
initiative period that followed Enron’s 2001 bankruptcy, but never implemented because
of adamant opposition from the accounting industry and a lack of persuasive evidence of
its efficacy. Mandatory audit firm rotation resurfaced in the U.S. in a PCAOB Concept
Release in 2011. Continuing auditor independence concerns for U.S. registrants
(Gramling et al., 2010; Roush et al., 2011), and implementation of mandatory audit firm
rotation in several jurisdictions abroad, emphasize the continuing importance of the issue.
The use of selective or locally required audit firm rotation has been considered and
implemented in a few countries, including South Korea (Kim & Yi, 2009) and China
(Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2012). Further, several U.S. state or local jurisdictions have adopted
rotation policies for specified companies or non-profit organizations, suggesting selective
rotation as an alternative to wide-scale mandatory rotation policy. Corporations also can
implement their own rotation policies in response to shareholder pressure, newly adopted
best practices, or audit committee directives (Fontaine, Khemakhem, & Herda, 2015;
Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013). Most recently, the SEC is discussing a new requirement that
audit committees disclose auditor tenure in audit committee reports, potentially bringing
auditor tenure further attention from investors and analysts (Whitehouse, 2015).
The audit committee of the board of directors has assumed increased
responsibility for promoting higher quality of reported information and promoting
increased auditor objectivity and independence from management since the passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002). Although company management retains
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responsibility for preparing financial statements, an independent audit committee
possessing at least a minimum of accounting/financial expertise is charged with the
hiring, dismissal, and oversight of an external auditor to provide independent testing of
the financial statements, and with settling auditor/management disagreements over
proposed audit adjustments (SOX 2002). These three parties – management, auditor, and
audit committee – represent the governance mechanisms that are responsible for shaping
the audited annual reports filed by U.S. exchange registrants (Brown & Wright, 2008;
Carver, 2014). This proposed study addresses recent calls for research on the processes
and interrelationships among management, the auditor, and the audit committee (Beasley,
Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009; Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Carcello, Hermanson, &
Ye, 2011; Salleh & Stewart, 2012) by focusing on the audit committee’s role in auditorclient management disputes, specifically how this role is affected by mandatory audit
firm rotation and auditor tenure.
Although some research has been done on audit committee support for the auditor
in auditor/management disputes under varying conditions (e.g., Bierstaker, Cohen,
DeZoort, & Hermanson, 2012; DeZoort, Hermanson, & Houston, 2003a, 2003b, 2008),
and on the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation on the auditor in auditor/management
dispute negotiation (Arel et al., 2006; Dopuch et al., 2001; Wang & Tuttle, 2009), no
studies to date have considered the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation or auditor
tenure on audit committee judgment in dispute resolution. Mandatory audit firm rotation
and consideration of auditor tenure should introduce new complexity into the audit
committee’s resolution of auditor/management disputes, given the unique
independence/expertise trade-off identified in the literature.

5
The purpose of this study is to assess the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation
and audit firm tenure on audit committee member support in auditor/management
disputes over subjective accounting issues. In a case-based experimental setting, 109 U.S.
public company audit committee members provided data for the primary analysis. A 2x2
factorial design was used to manipulate the independent variables – mandatory audit firm
rotation (required or not required) and audit firm tenure (short or long) – betweensubjects, and audit committee member support for the audit firm or management was
measured as the primary dependent variable. Hypotheses related to audit committee
support for the audit firm or management were developed for testing, applying the auditor
reliability framework (Taylor, DeZoort, Munn & Thomas, 2003; DeZoort, Holt, &
Taylor, 2012) to define and provide a validated measurement model for relevant
constructs. The reliability framework maintains that audit firm integrity supports
perceptions of audit firm independence and expertise. It further suggests that perceptions
of audit firm integrity, expertise, and independence contribute to perceptions of audit firm
objectivity, and ultimately audit firm reliability.
Importantly, the use of the auditor reliability framework (Taylor, DeZoort, Munn
& Thomas, 2003; DeZoort, Holt, & Taylor, 2012) allows for the clarification and precise
measurement of key constructs, including differences among auditor independence,
objectivity, and reliability, that often have been confused in the auditing and auditor
rotation literature. The current study is, to my knowledge, the first study to incorporate
the auditor reliability framework into the audit committee literature. I predict that level of
audit firm tenure and rotation will influence audit committee member perceptions of audit
firm expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability. Furthermore, I posit that long
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audit firm tenure will lead to increased audit committee member support for the audit
firm in an accounting dispute, as will the absence of required audit firm rotation.
The primary results indicate that the long audit firm tenure group assessed audit
firm reliability higher than the short tenure group. Participants believed that the typical
audit committee member would be more supportive of longer tenured auditors. When
controlling for social desirability bias, the long tenure group provided more support for
the audit firm proposed adjustment than the short tenure group. Participants with more
years of audit committee experience were more supportive of the audit firm. A
marginally significant interaction between audit firm tenure and rotation resulted in the
short tenure group assessing audit firm independence higher when rotation was required
than when rotation was not required. The hypotheses predicting differences in responses
for objectivity, reliability and support based on audit firm rotation (required or not
required) are not supported. CPA status was associated with perceptions of auditor
expertise, independence, and objectivity, with CPAs having more favorable views than
non-CPAs. Comments from participants provide insight into the judgment and decision
making process for public company audit committee members.
This research extends the literature on the audit committee’s role in
auditor/management dispute resolution under varying levels of audit firm rotation / tenure
when the accounting issue is subjective. The study also contributes to research on audit
committee judgment and decision-making, and further extends the application of the
auditor reliability framework in audit settings. The study has policy implications, adding
to the literature on the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation and audit firm tenure on
financial reporting quality and auditor independence. The current study also has practice
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implications, providing insights into the possible effects of audit committee adoption of
audit firm rotation at the company level.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Auditor Rotation and Tenure
Auditing standards and auditor codes of conduct require independence from client
management and objectivity for auditors in financial accounting examinations (e.g., SOX
Title I, section 103; AICPA Rule 101). While auditor independence and objectivity are
promoted through regulation and professional standards, questions remain as to the
efficacy of the current regulations (Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2011; Gramling
et al., 2010). Concerns about auditor tenure and its impact on auditor independence and
objectivity led to discussions of limits on audit firm tenure when SOX was being
developed, although ultimately mandatory rotations of audit partners in charge of the
audit engagement, rather than audit firms, was included in SOX.
The PCAOB commissioned the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to
conduct a study of mandatory audit firm rotation in 2003, resulting in a GAO
recommendation that mandatory audit firm rotation was not in the best interests of public
policy at the time (GAO 2003).1 The PCAOB withdrew its concept release on mandatory
audit firm rotation issued in 2011, but the SEC and PCAOB continue to keep the issue
within their armory for potential use in promoting auditor independence and objectivity.
The retention of mandatory firm rotation as an option may be for good reason, because
mandatory audit firm rotation rises to the top of U.S. public interest advocacy issues for
1

The GAO 2003 report cites costs of mandatory audit firm rotation in excess of the benefits and allowing
sufficient time for SOX (2002) auditor independence enhancing regulation to be fully implemented and
working as reasons for deferring additional study on implementing mandatory audit firm rotation in the
U.S. at that time.
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public accountancy with surprising regularity. Opponents of mandatory audit firm
rotation were successful in pressuring the U.S. House of Representatives to pass a 2012
bill that would amend SOX (2002) to prohibit the adoption of mandatory audit firm
rotation (H.R. 1564). The pressure to pass such a bill most likely stems from continuing
concern over renewed mandatory audit firm rotation sentiment for U.S. public
companies. However, adoption of mandatory audit firm rotation in jurisdictions abroad
will apply to and impact statutory audits of some overseas business units of U.S. public
companies with global operations, regardless of these domestic actions.
Proponents of mandatory audit firm rotation traditionally cite two primary
arguments for its adoption: 1) the quality of audit work tends to decrease over time and
mandatory rotation provides a “fresh look” and 2) auditor independence and objectivity
can be compromised by a long-term relationship with client management (Hoyle, 1978).
Although a presumed link between extended auditor tenure and reduced independence /
quality of audits—and so financial reporting—is the driving force behind attempts to
implement mandatory audit firm rotation, academic studies have not found that greater
auditor tenure is consistent with earnings quality deterioration (Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008).
Rather, research findings support that extended auditor tenure can result in benefits
related to the auditor’s industry and firm-specific expertise. This expertise/experience
argument is one of the most cited reasons for opposition to mandatory audit firm rotation
(Casterella & Johnston, 2013; Lim & Tan, 2010; Stefaniak et al., 2009). Evidence
suggests that the risks of audit failure can be more pronounced in the early years of an
audit engagement (Cameran, Francis, Marra, & Pettinicchio, 2015; Carcello & Nagy,
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2004), and earnings quality is higher with longer auditor tenure (Myers, Myers, & Omer,
2003), lending more support to the benefits of longer auditor tenure.
Jenkins & Vermeer (2013), however, consider the extant evidence regarding
auditor tenure and audit quality on the whole as inconclusive. These accounting
researchers find the research subject to bias from studying a presumed mandatory rotation
effect in a voluntary auditor change environment, including the U.S. audit market.
Jenkins & Vermeer (2013) suggest further that the relationship between auditor tenure
and audit quality is not linear, but goes through auditor learning and auditor closeness
phases. Casterella & Johnson (2013) also point out the weakness in many mandatory
audit firm rotation studies conducted in environments of voluntary, rather than
mandatory, auditor change. Additionally, Casterella & Johnson (2013) discuss issues
related to auditor self-selection bias. The auditor self-selection bias results from poor
performing, high audit risk firms changing auditors frequently, reinforcing the findings of
negative outcomes of low auditor tenure clients. More stable companies tend to keep the
same auditor for a longer period, reinforcing the appearance of higher quality for longer
auditor tenures.
Some academic studies lend support to the perceived benefits of mandatory audit
firm rotation on auditor independence and objectivity (Arel et al., 2006; Bamber & Iyer,
2007; Dopuch et al., 2001; Joe, Wright & Wright, 2011; Wang & Tuttle, 2009). In a postSOX study of auditor response to management pressure, client management still
influences auditor judgment in some firms (Hatfield, Jackson, & Vandervelde, 2011).
Therefore, consideration of measures to increase auditor objectivity and independence
from management, like mandatory audit firm rotation, are not unreasonable. While the
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PCAOB has retreated from consideration of proposed mandatory audit firm rotation for
U.S. registrants (PCAOB, 2013), other countries have implemented mandatory audit firm
rotation, including Brazil, Italy, and Singapore. The European Common Market has
passed a 10 year mandatory audit firm rule effective in 2016, with provisions allowing
the extension of the mandatory rotation period by 10 or 14 years under specific
circumstances.
The European rule is cited as a method of reducing audit market concentration
issues by forcing the consideration of second-tier accounting firms (firms other than Big
4) when a replacement auditor is required. Market concentration concerns–that the Big 4
firms control too much of the public company auditing market–are evident in the U.S. as
well (GAO, 2003, 2008; US Treasury, 2008). Boone, Khurana & Raman (2012) find an
association between auditor concentration and increased auditor tolerance for earnings
management, lending credence to the concern over market concentration as a threat to
auditor independence.
Although much of the academic and public policy discussion of mandatory audit
firm rotation focuses on auditor independence, the goal of rotation is ultimately an
increase in audit quality and auditor reliability. The many definitions of audit quality, and
the identification of proxies for its measurement, add to the difficulty in synthesizing the
academic literature on auditor tenure and rotation. DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit
quality is defined by the probability that an auditor will both detect a potential
misstatement and report it. Proxies used for operationalizing audit quality include the
willingness of the auditor to give a going concern opinion (an independence proxy), the
occurrence of financial restatements or litigation, and financial statement discretionary
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accruals (see Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury, 2013 for a review). As
discussed in more detail in a later section, auditor reliability exists when users of
information find the auditor’s work credible and dependable (Taylor et al., 2003).
One study of auditor rotation policies and their impact on loan officer perceptions
finds that while auditor rotation increased perceptions of auditor independence, it did not
affect perceptions of audit quality (Daniels & Booker, 2011). Kaplan & Mauldin (2008)
find that non-professional investors’ perceptions of auditor independence are not
enhanced by audit firm rotation, compared to the already required audit partner rotation.
This finding is inconsistent with an earlier study (Gates, Lowe, & Reckers, 2007),
although Gates et al. find audit firm rotation increases individuals’2 confidence in
financial statements, while audit partner rotation does not. Kaplan & Mauldin (2008) find
further that a strong audit committee, as opposed to a weak audit committee, can enhance
non-professional investors’ perception of auditor independence.
In regards to auditor tenure, a study of investor and financial information
intermediary perceptions of auditor tenure finds increased auditor tenure associated with
perceptions of increased auditor quality, and increased return coefficients on reported
earnings (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). Ghosh and Moon (2005) maintain that these findings
could imply “unintended costs on capital market participants” (p. 588) from required
audit firm rotation that limits auditor tenure. In an experimental study using
undergraduate students as proxies for jurors, Brandon & Mueller (2008) find that while
increased tenure is associated with decreased assessments of auditor independence,
increased tenure is also associated with increased assessments of auditor competence.
Thus, the independence/expertise argument has been tested in the litigation setting. In this
2

This study used MBA and law students as subjects.
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study, I will test the independence/expertise trade-off as it applies to audit committee
judgment and decision-making in settling accounting disputes.
In the following sections, a literature review of the audit committee’s role in
accounting dispute resolution, specifically disputes involving subjective accounting
issues, is presented. A discussion of the auditor reliability framework (Taylor et al., 2003;
DeZoort et al., 2012) then follows. The positioning of the reliability framework as a
means of evaluating the complex array of ethical constructs that will be applied to audit
committee judgment and decision-making in accounting disputes involving audit firm
proposed adjustments of a subjective nature is then explained. Development of
hypotheses for testing follows.
The Audit Committee’s Role in Auditor/Management Disputes
Regulations in SOX (section 301) require the audit committee to settle disputes
between the auditor and management. PCAOB (AS 16, para 22) expects the audit
committee to be apprised of all contentious accounting issues, even if they are settled
between the auditor and management. When auditor/management disputes are brought to
the audit committee, the audit committee members are expected to settle the dispute over
the proposed adjustment. This settlement involves determining if an adjustment should be
made to the financial statements, as the auditor suggests, and the amount to be recorded
or disclosed.
Pomeroy (2010) finds that audit committee members investigate management
accounting decisions more as the decisions become increasingly aggressive, providing
some support that audit committee members actively oversee financial reporting.
However, the role of the audit committee in resolving disputes is not consistently
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portrayed in the literature, with varying degrees of involvement and effectiveness
presented in the research. Several studies find that in some firms auditor/management
disputes are expected to be resolved without the audit committee’s involvement (Cohen,
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2010; Gendron & Bédard, 2006). Additional studies find that
the role of audit committees in dispute resolution is limited (Gibbins, McCracken, &
Salterio, 2005; Gibbins, Salterio, & Webb, 2001).
In contrast, there are studies consistent with the audit committee now playing a
greater role in promoting auditor independence from management in general and in
auditor/management dispute resolution in particular. Fontaine, Khemakhem, & Herda
(2015) find in a recent interview study with Canadian audit committee members that
these audit committee members feel they are capable of promoting auditor independence
without mandatory audit firm rotation, and they see mandatory audit firm rotation as
interfering wth their authority to oversee the external auditor. In an experimental setting,
DeZoort et al. (2008) find that audit committee members were more supportive of the
auditor in auditor/management disputes post-SOX, compared to the pre-SOX period.
Cohen at al. (2010) report that audit partners and managers believe audit committee
influence has increased post-SOX.
The audit committee can also moderate threats to auditor independence through
financial reporting and auditor engagement oversight, according to a study by Sharma,
Sharma, & Ananthanarayanan (2011). Salleh & Stewart (2012) apply a case study
approach to seven public companies in Malaysia and find that the audit committee plays a
very active role in auditor/management dispute resolution. Many of the experimental
studies on audit committee judgment in accounting dispute resolution find that audit
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committee members, particularly those associated with strong audit committees,
generally do support the auditor proposed adjustment, although the level of support varies
based on manipulated conditions (Kaplan & Mauldin, 2008).
Misplaced audit committee member support in auditor/management disputes can
lead to financial reporting errors, those requiring restatements in particular, that can result
in loss of current and future board of director seats (Srinivasan, 2005). The potential for
lost board seats can provide incentive for audit committee members to support the
auditor’s proposed adjustment, particularly when the issue is more objective (DeZoort et
al., 2003a). Keune & Johnstone (2012) find that audit committees with high expertise,
combined with external auditor concerns about reputational penalties, lead to fewer
waived adjustments.
These reputational risks, to the audit committee and the auditor, can lead to more
conservatism in financial reporting, and more audit committee support for the auditor.
The auditor has reason to gauge the independence of the audit committee from
management when approaching dispute resolution, particularly when there is pressure to
manage earnings (Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2011). One caveat,
though, is the degree of CEO influence in nominating the audit committee member,
which can reduce the member’s support for the auditor (Carcello et al., 2011; Lisic, Neal,
& Zhang, 2011). CEO influence has the potential to protect audit committee members
from loss of current and future board seats if a restatement should occur (Carver, 2014),
leading to lower audit committee support for the auditor.
SOX (2002) gave the power for the hiring, dismissing, compensation, and
oversight of the external auditor to the audit committee. Reserving this power for the
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audit committee, as opposed to management, is designed to protect the auditor from
management threats of dismissal that are presumed to interfere with auditor
independence. Audit committee control over the external auditor can be evident in
practice if the audit committee is relatively free from management influence in selecting
and retaining the auditor.
Prior academic research supports that objective accounting issues result in
increased audit committee member support for the auditor (DeZoort et al., 2003a; Knapp,
1987; Ng & Tan, 2003; Wright & Wright, 1997). Although these studies did not
specifically test audit committee support for the auditor in consideration of mandatory
audit firm rotation, the presence of authoritative guidance for an objective auditor
proposed adjustment leaves little room for an independent audit commmitee member to
withhold support for the auditor regardless of the presence or absence of mandatory audit
form rotation. Audit committee support for auditor proposed adjustments is less assured
in accounting disputes involving subjective accounting issues requiring estimation and
judgment. The lack of predictability of audit committee support supplies the tension in
this experimental study, as audit committee members’ judgment and decision-making
results regarding subjective auditor proposed adustments can vary widely. Accounting
disputes involving subjective accounting issues are the focus of my study.
When the accounting dispute involves a subjective accounting issue, the auditor
has less technical and authoritative support for the auditor proposed adjustment, and the
disposition of the disagreement is arguably in greater doubt. Brown-Liburd & Wright
(2011) suggest that these subjective issues often require auditor-client negotiations,
compared to “objective, clear-cut issues”. This finding is consistent with several other
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studies (Gibbins, Salterio, & Webb, 2001; Salleh & Stewart, 2012) that find accounting
issues with less authoritative guidance—subjective issues—require negotiation between
the auditor and client, and are identified as the type of issues auditors are more willing to
discuss (Nelson, Elliot, & Tarpley, 2002). It follows that the issues most prone to
negotiation between the auditor and management are the issues most likely to reach the
audit committee.
Prior research suggests that when the issue in the dispute involves interpretation
and judgment, the auditor is potentially at a disadvantage to management in the
negotiation process (Deis & Giroux, 1992), and the disadvantage could carry over when
the dispute reaches the audit committee. Audit adjustments characterized as subjective
were waived by the auditor more often than adjustments characterized as objective
(Braun, 2001; Nelson, Elliot, & Tarpley, 2002; Wright & Wright, 1997). Auditors could
be perceived as less persuasive by audit committee members when less authoritative
guidance is present, as in the case of a subjective accounting issue. The subjectivity of the
accounting issue could lead to lower perceived auditor expertise compared to
management, particularly firm specific expertise, when issue based judgment is required.
Additionally, the auditor’s argument could appear less compelling than the arguments put
forth by management to waive the proposed adjustment due to management’s first-hand
knowledge of the business. The reduced perception of auditor expertise or the
persuasiveness of the management argument has the potential to decrease audit
committee support for the auditor in some accounting dispute situations.
Auditor Reliability Framework and Hypotheses Development
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While agency theory, discussed in Chapter 1, provides an overall theoretical
framework for this study of audit committee support for the auditor in resolving
auditor/management disputes, the auditor Reliability Framework (Taylor et al., 2003,
DeZoort et al., 2012) helps to explain the judgment and decision-making process of the
audit committee members. The framework helps define and sort out the complex ethical
constructs underlying the audit committee members’ assessment of auditor reliability,
and identify relationships among the constructs. A significant issue in audit quality
research is a lack of consistency in and universal understanding of the constructs used to
describe auditor characteristics such as independence and objectivity. DeZoort et al.
(2012) assert that references to auditor independence impairments are overused, and the
real issue in many cases is auditor objectivity, integrity, or reliability (Taylor et al.,
2003). Taylor et al. (2003) developed an auditor reliability framework, further refined in
DeZoort et al. (2012), to clarify and operationalize these auditor related constructs. The
framework has since been expanded to apply to non-audit assurance situations, as well,
not just in the audit setting (DeZoort & Taylor, 2009). The reliability framework, adapted
for use in this case, is shown in Figure 1.
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AUDIT COMMITTEE
MEMBER SUPPORT
FOR THE AUDITOR
PROPOSED
ADJUSTMENT

AUDITOR
RELIABILITY

AUDITOR
OBJECTIVITY

AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE

AUDITOR
EXPERTISE

AUDITOR
INTEGRITY

Fig. 1. Conceptual framework. Constructs up to and including Auditor Reliability introduced by Taylor et
al. (2003) and modified in DeZoort et al. (2012).

Auditor integrity (a focus on truthful reporting) is the framework’s foundation and
a critical antecedent to auditor independence, expertise, objectivity, and reliability.
Reliability is the crux of the framework, defined as “a condition where stakeholders
consistently find the auditor’s work credible and dependable, even after acknowledging
the inherent limitations of audit and other attest functions” (DeZoort et al., 2012, pp. 519520). Auditor expertise and independence influence auditor objectivity, which in turn
influences auditor reliability. The framework also posits that integrity influences auditor
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reliability directly and indirectly through its influence on auditor expertise, independence,
and objectivity. One of the most important findings from an empirical test of the
relationships in the reliability framework is that auditor reliability can be achieved
through objectivity, expertise, and integrity even when auditor independence from
management is compromised through the provision of non-audit services (DeZoort et al.,
2012). The construct definitions related to the auditor reliability framework are provided
below in Table 1 (wording below is from or adapted from DeZoort et al. (2012)).
Table 1 Auditor Reliability Framework Construct Definitions
CONSTRUCT
DEFINITION
Ability to be straightforward, honest, and
Auditor Integrity
forthright in all professional and business
activities; focus on “truthful reporting”
Technical knowledge, ability, and
Auditor Expertise
experience needed to achieve task-specific
superior performance
A relationship based construct where by
Auditor Independence
the auditor is not biased by management
Auditor’s state of mind and ability to
Auditor Objectivity
manage cognitive biases and subjectivity
that inherently affect professional
judgments and decisions
A condition where stakeholders
Auditor Reliability
consistently find the auditor’s work and
opinion credible and dependable

Several experimental studies on audit committee member support for the auditor
in accounting disputes provide the best available insights into the reasons that audit
committee members provide support for the auditor, and these reasons can generally be
linked to auditor reliability. DeZoort & Salterio (2001) cite reasons for audit committee
support for the auditor in their study of audit committee dispute resolution and find
auditor expertise as an area of concern. Auditor expertise is an element of the auditor
reliability framework, influencing auditor objectivity and reliability.
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DeZoort et al. (2008) provide comparative rationales for audit committee support
for auditor proposed adjustments pre- and post-SOX in their experimental study. DeZoort
et al. (2008) find that materiality, quality reporting, and risk were the most commonly
cited rationale for auditor support pre-SOX, with auditor credibility cited by 18% of
subjects. Post-SOX, DeZoort et al. (2008) find reporting accuracy has replaced
materiality as the rationale most cited by audit committee members for supporting the
auditor, followed by conservatism and immediate resolution, materiality, and auditor
credibility (13% of subjects.) Support for the auditor based on reporting accuracy can be
interpreted as an indication of perceived auditor expertise and/or independence.
Conservatism in reporting could indicate an assessment of auditor independence
or objectivity, as auditors propose adjustments to correct for management’s aggressive
reporting assessment. Bierstaker et al. (2012) find in their study of audit committee
support for the auditor under varying audit committee compensation schemes that
conservatism and auditor objectivity were the primary rationales for auditor support.
Auditor objectivity is one of the antecedents to auditor reliability in the reliability
framework, and is influenced by expertise and independence.
Audit Firm Expertise
In settling auditor/management disputes, the audit committee must consider the
domain expertise of the auditor in terms of technical and industry knowledge and ability,
as well as the firm-specific expertise of the auditor. In the reliability framework (Taylor
et al., 2003; DeZoort et al., 2012) expertise is an antecedent to objectivity, and objectivity
is an antecedent to reliability. One primary criticism of mandatory audit firm rotation is
the loss of firm specific expertise resulting from the required periodic auditor change.
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Several frequently cited studies (for example, Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Geiger &
Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002) support that longer auditor tenure is associated
with increased audit quality, with audit quality measured by absence of fraudulent
reporting, audit failure for companies in bankruptcy, and the extent of discretionary
accruals, respectively. Knapp (1991) notes in his study of audit committee members
specifically that long auditor tenure is viewed by audit committee members as a proxy for
audit quality. Chi (2005) emphasizes the need for the auditor to gain experience and build
client-specific assets in order to achieve higher audit quality. A more recent study (Chi,
Lisic, & Pevner, 2011) supported the association between longer auditor tenure and
increased earnings quality, measured by discretionary accruals.3
Kwon, Lim, & Simnett (2014) note in their study of mandatory audit firm rotation
in South Korea that the auditor in new engagements tend to “rely on clients’ estimates
and representations” (p. 7) because they lack firm-specific knowledge about operating,
accounting, and internal control systems. In an early article on mandatory audit firm
rotation, Hoyle (1978) notes that the “complexity and size of most modern businesses
simply do not lend themselves to short audit engagements” (p. 6). In addition to tenure
effects, required audit firm rotation is expected to lessen the incentive audit firms have to
develop firm specific expertise from the beginning of the relationship, because they will
be unable to use the expertise when the rotation period ends (Jones et al., 2012).
Overall, because audit firm size and characteristics, like specialization, will be
held constant in the experimental case, the assessment of auditor expertise by audit
committee members should be based on primarily the manipulation of auditor tenure

3

Chi et al. (2011) also find, though, that firms were more likely to resort to “real earnings management”
when accrual earnings management was constrained by a higher quality audit.
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between short and long. But required audit firm rotation is also expected to affect the
audit committee members’ assessment of audit firm expertise, as a required rotation
could reduce the incentive audit firms have to build and develop client-specific
knowledge. It was noted in the 2003 GAO report on mandatory audit firm rotation that
59% of Tier 1 audit firms indicated that under mandatory audit firm rotation, they would
reposition the “most knowledgeable and experienced” audit staff before the end of
limited engagement period to “help attract and retain” other clients.4 In this study, I
expect long audit firm tenure and no required rotation to lead to higher audit committee
member perception of audit firm expertise. Formally stated:
H1a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm expertise as higher when
audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short.
H1b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm expertise as higher when
audit firm rotation is not required than when rotation is required.
Audit Firm Independence
In regards to independence, a perceived or assumed lack of independence between
the auditor and the client management fuels the debate over mandatory audit firm
rotation. When rotation is not required, the threat to independence results from the
auditor’s desire to maintain the potential future revenue stream from remaining in the
audit engagement (DeAngelo 1981). The resulting economic bond, according to
proponents of mandatory audit firm rotation, can result in the auditor succumbing to
management pressure to waive or withdraw proposed adjustments to please management.
In the auditor reliability framework (Taylor et al., 2003; DeZoort et al., 2012)
independence, along with expertise, is an antecedent of auditor objectivity.

4

The GAO defined Tier 1 audit firms as the 97 public accounting firms that had 10 or more public
company clients.
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The manipulation of audit firm rotation (required/not required) should influence
audit committee assessments of audit firm independence. Required audit firm rotation is
presumed to increase perceptions of audit firm independence for those outside the
financial reporting process, particularly investors (Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013). Required
rotation addresses potential conflicts of interest arising from economic bonding and is
viewed as an “effective antidote” to management pressure (Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013).
Because the audit committee is mandated to enhance audit firm independence and protect
the interests of shareholders (investors) from management, required rotation is expected
to increase audit committee perceptions of audit firm independence.
Audit firm tenure is also expected to influence audit committee member
perceptions of audit firm independence. Several studies have considered the association
between auditor tenure and perceptions of auditor independence from management, some
finding that increased auditor tenure is not necessarily associated with perceptions of
impaired auditor independence. Iyer & Rama (2004) find that CPA subjects acting as
CEOs, CFOs, controllers, and treasurers perceive they are more able to persuade a short
tenure auditor than a long tenure auditor to accept the management position in an
accounting dispute. And increased auditor tenure alone does not bring the auditor’s
independence from management into question for audit committee members, according
to a mixed methods study by Almer, Philbrick, & Rupley (2014).
In contrast, there are studies that find auditor independence decreasing as tenure
increases. Davis, Soo, & Trompeter (2009) and Chu, Church, & Zhang (2012) find
evidence of decreased audit quality after the 14th year of auditor tenure in separate
studies, with both studies using sample data from 1988 to 2006. The accounting literature
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also suggests that the auditor tenure/auditor independence relationship is non-linear, and
that the association between auditor tenure and measures of audit quality can change over
time (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2008; Jenkins & Velury, 2008). I predict in this study
that long audit firm tenure will decrease audit committee perceptions of audit firm
independence. To formally state the hypotheses related to audit committee perceptions of
audit firm independence:
H2a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm independence as higher
when audit firm tenure is short than when tenure is long.
H2b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm independence as higher
when audit firm rotation is required than when rotation is not required.
Audit Firm Objectivity5
In assessing the auditor’s objectivity, audit committee members will consider
their assessment of auditor expertise and independence, in addition to any effect of
integrity. The hypotheses related to audit firm tenure/rotation and audit firm expertise and
independence are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 Summary of Hypotheses Related to Audit Firm Expertise and Independence
MANIPULATION

5

AUDIT COMMITTEE
PERCEPTION OF AUDIT FIRM
EXPERTISE

AUDIT COMMITTEE
PERCEPTION OF AUDIT FIRM
INDEPENDENCE

AUDIT FIRM TENURE

Long tenure increases perception
of audit firm expertise

Short tenure increases perception
of audit firm independence

AUDIT FIRM ROTATION

No required rotation increases
perception of audit firm expertise

Required rotation increases
perception of audit firm
independence

In addition to the audit firm’s expertise and independence, audit committee members likely also consider
audit firm integrity as they determine their level of support for the audit firm in settling the accounting
dispute. DeZoort et al. (2012) note that judgments about audit firm integrity provide the basis for users of
accounting information to trust that the audit firm has expertise and independence. The academic literature
provides no guidance to predict the effect of audit firm rotation and tenure on perceptions of audit firm
integrity, although testing of the auditor reliability framework (DeZoort et al., 2012) has supported
perceptions of auditor integrity as positively related to perceptions of auditor reliability for commercial
lenders. Due to the lack of a basis in the literature for predicting the influence of auditor tenure or rotation
on audit committee perceptions of auditor integrity, I gather data on the committee members’ assessment of
auditor integrity for analysis, but no formal hypothesis is tested.
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In this study, because the accounting dispute involves a subjective accounting
issue, audit firm expertise is expected to weigh more heavily in the audit committee
member’s assessment of objectivity than is the audit firm’s independence. Furthermore,
because the issue has already reached the audit committee, the perception of audit firm
independence from management is likely less of a concern. As audit committee members
address this independence/expertise trade-off, I expect the audit firm expertise
characteristics will influence audit committee member judgment more than the
independence concerns. An audit quality meta-analysis conducted by Lin & Hwang
(2010) finds that the benefit of longer auditor tenure outweighs the “potential
independence impairments” and that longer auditor tenure is negatively associated with
earnings management. Although Gavious (2007) notes that the accounting profession’s
reputation was damaged by scandals at Enron and WorldCom, Hollingsworth & Li
(2012) find that investors’ concerns over economic bonding have decreased since the
passage of SOX. The observed decrease in concerns over economic bonding since SOX
adds to the expectation that audit committee members in this post-SOX study will weigh
the expertise effects of increased tenure more heavily than any independence impairment
effects on objectivity.
I predict, then, that long tenure and no required rotation will be associated with
higher audit committee perceptions of audit firm objectivity. The hypotheses related to
audit committee perceptions of audit firm objectivity stated formally:
H3a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm objectivity as higher when
audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short.
H3b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm objectivity as higher when
audit firm rotation is not required than when rotation is required.
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Audit Firm Reliability
The focus of the auditor reliability framework (Taylor et al., 2003, DeZoort et al.,
2012) is auditor reliability, which follows from perceptions of auditor objectivity.
Auditor reliability is defined in the framework (Taylor et al., 2003, p. 258) as the
“condition where stakeholders consistently find the auditor’s work and opinion credible
and dependable.” DeZoort et al. (2012) find support for their hypothesized relationship
between objectivity and reliability in their study of the auditor reliability framework
applied to commercial lenders’ judgments. I posit that long tenure and no required
rotation will lead to higher levels of perceived audit firm objectivity by audit committee
members, and so extend this reasoning to audit committee perceptions of audit firm
reliability.
H4a: Audit committee members will assess audit firm reliability as higher when
audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short.
H4b: Audit committee members will assess audit firm reliability as higher when
audit firm rotation is not required than when rotation is required.

Support for the Audit Firm or Management
The audit committee member assessments of audit firm expertise, independence,
integrity, objectivity and reliability will influence their level of Support for the audit firm
or management in the accounting dispute, the primary dependent variable in this study.
Because I argue that long audit firm tenure will enhance audit committee perceptions of
audit firm expertise, objectivity, and reliability, and have a limited negative effect on
audit committee member assessments of audit firm independence, I posit that audit
committee members will provide more support for the audit firm proposed adjustment
when audit firm tenure is long rather than when tenure is short.
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H5a: Audit committee members will provide stronger support for a proposed
audit adjustment when audit firm tenure is long than when tenure is short.
Additionally, because I propose that the absence of mandatory rotation will lead
to increased assessments of audit firm expertise, objectivity, and reliability despite the
possibility of an increased perception of audit firm independence impairment, I posit that
audit committee members will provide more support for the audit firm proposed
adjustment when rotation is not required, compared to when it is required.
H5b: Audit committee members will provide stronger support for a proposed
audit adjustment when mandatory audit firm rotation is not required than when
rotation is required.

CHAPTER 3 METHODS
Participants
The participants in the study were public company audit committee members
drawn from the Audit Analytics database. Because this study tests hypotheses related to
audit committee member judgment, actual audit committee members are the preferred
population from which to draw subjects, following Bierstaker et al. (2012), DeZoort et al.
(2003a, 2003b, 2008), and Knapp (1987). Audit committee members appointed between
2011 and 2013 were selected to provide a pool of potential participants with at least two
years of audit committee experience. The selection was then filtered to focus on audit
committee appointments to companies with less than $4 billion in assets, so as to be
reasonably comparable to the company in the case materials. This process resulted in
over 2,000 potential audit committee member participants.
Each potential participant was then checked manually against the corporate proxy
filing to verify audit committee membership. Potential participants were eliminated if
they no longer were serving on the audit committee, if no proxy for the corporation was
filed, or if the corporation had a foreign address or was currently being acquired by
another company. Audit committee members with duplicate addresses, whether the
addresses were for the corporation being served or the audit committee members’
business addresses, were eliminated to avoid potential collusion on the completion of the
experimental case.
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This selection process resulted in the identification of 866 audit committee
members with unique addresses, and all were included on the mailing list. In the Results
section, I provide specifics on the backgrounds and characteristics of the participants.
Administrative Procedure
While some populations, e.g. college students, are adept at technology and prefer
a web-based delivery of requests for participation, other populations (educated and
professionally trained) prefer mailed requests for participation (Shih & Fan, 2008). The
experimental instrument was mailed through the United States Postal Service in priority
mail envelopes, accompanied by an introduction letter from the dissertation committee
chair, an Institutional Review Board approved cover letter hand signed by the researcher,
a set of instructions, and a stamped pre-addressed return envelope. Audit committee
members on the mailing list were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups,
and the corresponding instrument mailed.
The first responses were received within a week of the initial mailing and
continued for approximately eight weeks. Ten recipients who were not audit committee
members sent letters, called, or emailed to indicate their status. Undeliverable sets of
materials were also received, and if more accurate addresses were available, the
undeliverable sets of materials were re-mailed. For the first four weeks after the original
mailing, 65 sets of materials were re-mailed using regular USPS first class mail. Another
59 sets of materials were received but not re-mailed because better addresses could not be
found or they were received after four weeks from the initial mailing.
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After four weeks, one treatment group had relatively few responses; therefore, a
limited remailing of identical case materials to 80 randomly selected audit committee
members in this group was conducted. In total, 129 completed cases were received,6
including a minimum of 20 usable cases in each treatment group. A different return
mailing label was used for the limited second mailing to 80 audit committee members,
and none of these were returned completed. It is possible, though, that the receipt of the
second mailing by the selected participants served as a reminder to complete and mail the
original case. The final response rate, adjusted for non-audit committee member
notifications and returned materials, is 16%. This rate is within the range of past nonsponsored mailed studies using audit committee members as participants (Wilbanks et al.,
2015). Table 3 shows the breakdown of mailings and responses by treatment group. The
original number mailed is unadjusted for returns, and provides the number of mailings of
each case type out of the 866 total mailings.
Table 3 Mailings and Responses Received by Treatment Group
Treatment Group
1
2
3
#Mailed (unadjusted)
204
234
210
Cases received
28
31
31
Cases usable
21
30
25

4
218
38
33

Design and Experimental Manipulation
I used a 2x2 factorial design in this experimental study. I manipulated audit firm
tenure (short/long) and mandatory audit firm rotation (required/not required) randomly
between subjects in a fully crossed design. I designed a case-based instrument to present
and administer the experiment, and randomly assigned participants to the treatment
groups. I identified the treatment groups by the manipulation of the independent variables
6

One completed case was returned by a respondent who had no public company audit committee
experience; this case was excluded from the response count.
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for audit firm tenure (short/long) and mandatory rotation (required/not required). Table 4
summarizes the 2x2 experimental design and includes the minimum number of
participants required in each cell, which was achieved.
Based on Casterella & Johnston (2013) and Johnson, Khurana, & Reynolds
(2002), I identified short tenure in the case as three years, and long tenure as 10 years (in
excess of the noted studies’ seven and nine years, respectively).7 Brandon & Mueller
(2008) test perceptions of tenure length in their study of juror assessments of blame
related to auditor tenure, and their results support my characterization of short and long
tenure.
TABLE 4 2X2 Experimental Design and Minimum Number of Participants
Audit Firm
Audit Firm
Rotation Required
Rotation Not Required
Short Audit Firm Tenure
(3 years)

15-20 Participants

15-20 Participants

Long Audit Firm Tenure
(10 years)

15-20 Participants

15-20 Participants

I developed the experimental instrument as a brief case that presented a subjective
accounting issue that had been brought to the audit committee after the audit firm and
company management were unable to reach an agreement. The experimental instrument
is provided in the appendix. The case provided background and current financial
information for a fictitious company in the packaged foods industry. Industry benchmarks
and actual public company financial data served as a pattern for the financial information

7

The European Union’s recently adopted mandatory audit firm rotation policy requires rotation
consideration at 10 years; Ghosh & Moon (2005) indicate average auditor tenure in their archival study at
9.5 years. Both support the use of 10 years as representative of a realistic long tenure situation.
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presented in the case. Some of the case data, wording, and questions were adapted from
prior studies (Arel et al., 2006; DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b; Libby & Kinney, 2000).
Through the case instrument, I presented a situation in which the audit firm had
proposed an adjustment to increase the size of the Allowance for Doubtful Accounts and
the accompanying Bad Debts Expense. The determination of an appropriate level of
accounts receivable bad debts involves estimation and judgment using historic trends and
current economic conditions, providing a sufficiently subjective accounting issue for the
experimental case. The judgment and subjectivity pose a challenge for auditing of
Accounts Receivables and related accounts, compounded by the exploitation of the
subjectivity of accounting for allowances and bad debt write-offs by some firms to
manage earnings (Riley & Pasewark, 2009).
I provided information in the case regarding audit committee practices and
characteristics, including the independence of the audit committee from management. I
also described company management—CEO and CFO—in terms of reputation and
tenure, providing a sound reputation to date and reasonable tenure to suggest prior
credibility. I also provided the Earnings per Share (EPS) consensus estimate, and
presented a case, following DeZoort et al. (2003b), wherein the impact of recording the
proposed audit firm adjustment results in a missed EPS estimate, while the management
position to waive the adjustment allows for achieving the EPS estimate.
The primary dependent variable is the audit committee members’ indicated level
of support for the audit firm or management in recording the audit firm proposed
adjustment in the subjective issue auditor/management dispute. The level of support was
measured in the experimental case instrument on a 0-10 scale, with 0 indicating
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unwillingness to record the proposed adjustment (support of the management position),
the 5 midpoint indicating a neutral position, and 10 indicating willingness to record the
proposed adjustment (support of the audit firm position). The support dependent variable
was used to test the posited influence of the manipulated variables (audit firm tenure and
the rotation condition) on support for the audit firm in the dispute.
Participants were then asked to answer a series of questions about audit firm
integrity, expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability using multi-item measures
adapted from DeZoort et al. (2012). According to research using these reliability
measures, audit firm independence and expertise impact audit firm objectivity, and audit
firm integrity and objectivity are the formative constructs for audit firm reliability. The
multi-item measures adapted from DeZoort et al. (2012) are shown in Table 5. The
participants’ assessments of these audit firm characteristics were used to test hypotheses.
Table 5 Measurement of Audit Firm Characteristics (DeZoort et al. 2012)
_______________________________________________________________________
Integrity
The audit firm’s professionals are truthful
I do not believe what the professionals at the audit firm tell mea
I trust the audit firm’s professionals in this case
The audit firm’s professionals are honest
Expertise
The audit firm has a great deal of experience
The audit firm lacks the expertise needed in this engagementa
The audit firm has the technical knowledge needed to complete this engagement
The audit firm has the ability to do the engagement
Independence
The audit firm is independent in its relationship with the company
The audit firm is independent of the company management
The audit firm is influenced by its financial relationship with the clienta
The audit firm can be pressured by management to waive adjustmentsa
Objectivity
The audit firm’s professionals are biased when providing services to the companya
The audit firm’s professionals provide unbiased services to the company
The audit firm’s professionals lack objectivity in their work related to the companya
The audit firm’s professionals are objective when providing services to the company
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Auditor Reliability
I can rely on the audit firm’s work when deciding if the proposed adjustment should be
recorded
The audit firm’s work for the company should not be relied upona
The audit firm’s proposed adjustment can be relied upon
I cannot rely on adjustments proposed by the audit firma
All items measured using an eleven-point scale anchored by 0 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly
Agree”, with a 5 = “Neutral” midpoint indicated.
a
Indicates an item that is reverse coded.

I included a post-experiment manipulation check to determine if the participants
noted the tenure and rotation conditions and remembered these conditions as they
answered questions regarding the dependent variables (Libby, Bloomfield & Nelson,
2002). Demographic data was also gathered from the participants.
Several accounting academic researchers reviewed the experimental case prior to
a pretest, and their feedback was incorporated into the case. The experimental materials
were pretested using graduate students in a Masters of Accountancy program, and
appropriate changes were made to the materials. The Institutional Review Board (IRB)
reviewed and approved the study and the experimental materials, and IRB guidelines
were followed in conducting the study.
The results were analyzed using multivariate analysis of covariance
(MANCOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to determine if significant
differences in the mean level of audit committee member Support (and the other
dependent variables) for the audit firm proposed adjustment can be identified between the
treatment groups. Covariates for MANCOVA / ANCOVA analysis were identified from
prior research, and included management experience, CPA certification, and years of
audit committee experience (e.g., Bierstaker et al., 2012; DeZoort et al., 2003a; DeZoort
& Salterio, 2001; Knapp, 1987). Both DeZoort & Salterio (2001) and Knapp (1987)
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found audit committee members who were top managers were more supportive of the
auditor. Bierstaker et al. (2012) and DeZoort et al. (2003a) found audit committee
experience related to support for the audit firm, and DeZoort et al. (2003a) found CPAs
to be more supportive of the auditor. The final MANCOVA model is shown below.
(Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Support) = ƒ (rotation, tenure,
rotation x tenure, natural log of #years AC experience, #years of management
experience, CPA status)8

After I analyzed the MANCOVA model, I used individual ANCOVA models to
test hypotheses H1 through H5. The ANCOVA model for H5 (Support) is shown below.
Similar ANCOVA models were used to test hypotheses H1 through H4.
Support = ƒ(rotation, tenure, rotation x tenure, natural log of #years audit
committee experience, #years management experience, CPA status)

8

Years of AC experience is skewed (p < 0.001), so I use the natural log of this variable.

CHAPTER 4 RESULTS
Manipulation Check
I asked the participants two manipulation check questions as part of the case
questions. The manipulation check helped to determine if the participants noted and
understood the audit firm tenure and rotation conditions and remembered them as they
completed questions about the dependent variables. I examined the manipulation check
responses from the public company audit committee members to determine if the
manipulation checks were passed. Of the 129 responses, two failed the tenure
manipulation check and six failed the rotation manipulation check. One respondent
returned the responses without the case materials, and so no manipulation check was
possible. The total pass rate for the manipulation check was 93%. This manipulation
check pass rate is higher than that of previous studies using audit committee members as
participants, including DeZoort et al. (2003a) (62%) and Bierstaker et al. (2012) (88%).
A further review of the responses indicated five with missing data for the dependent
variables, and six with no variation in their responses (straight-line) for the audit firm
characteristics questions. After removing these participants, 109 observations remained
for hypotheses testing.
Participant Demographics
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Table 6 provides demographic results for the 109 audit committee members. The
participants’ average age was 63, with a range of 44-75. Over 70% of the participants
were 60 or older. Almost 90% of the participants (96) were male, consistent with prior
research (DeZoort et al., 2003a, 2003b; Bierstaker et al., 2012). All of the participants
had a Bachelor’s degree, 38% had a Master’s degree, 11% had a law degree (JD), and 6%
had earned a PhD, DBA, or MD degree. Of the 109 participants, 41 (37.6%) held the
CPA certification, and 72 (66.1%) qualified as audit committee financial experts. In
terms of professional experience, 38 participants (34.9%) had external auditor
experience, and 90 participants (82.6%) reported having top management experience.
Slightly over half of the participants (53%) were retired.
In terms of industry, Banking/Financial Services industry was indicated by 31
participants, accounting for the highest percentage of respondents (28.4%), followed by
Pharma/Medical/Healthcare indicated by 26 participants (23.9%) and Energy/Oil & Gas
by 19 (17.4%). Accounting, Manufacturing, Real Estate, and Telecommunication/Media
industries were each indicated by 7 participants (6.4%). The top four job titles indicated
by participants were President/CEO (56 respondents, 51.4%), followed by Vice President
(39, 35.8%), CFO (19, 17.4%), and Partner (15, 13.8%).
Over half of the participants were currently serving just one audit committee (58
respondents, 53.3%), 26 participants (23.9%) were serving two audit committees, 15
(13.8%) were serving three audit committees, and eight (7.3%) were serving between
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four and seven audit committees.9 A majority of participants (67.6%) had served in total
three or fewer audit committees, 21 (19.5%) had served four or five total audit
committees, and 14 (13%) had served 6-11 audit committees. Approximately one third of
the participants (33.6%) reported the largest company on whose audit committee they
served had under $250 million in annual revenue, and another approximately one third
(34.6%) reported serving companies with total annual revenues of over $1 billion.
Participants reporting between 2 and 5 years of audit committee experience totaled 41
(37.6%), 54 (49.6%) reported 6 to 10 years of audit committee experience, and 14
(12.8%) reported 20 to 45 years of audit committee experience. Audit firm rotation had
been implemented by the corporate board for only 21 (19.3%) of the participants.
Table 6 Participant Demographics (n =109 Audit Committee Members)
Variable
Number
Percent
_________________________________________________________________________________

Age
44 - 48
50 - 59
60 - 69
70 - 75

2
29
51
26

1.9%
26.8%
47.2%
24.1%

Male
Female

96
11

89.7%
10.3%

Education (Highest Level)
Bachelors
Masters
JD
PhD/DBA/MD

48
41
12
8

46.1%
37.6%
11.1%
6.0%

Members with CPA certification

41

37.6%

Members Qualifying as Financial Experts

72

66.1%

Gender

9

Two participants out of the 109 usable responses are currently serving no audit committees, having
recently resigned from their audit committee positions. All respondents have a minimum of two years of
audit committee experience.
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Members with External Audit Experience
Years of External Audit Experience
Under 10 years
10 years - < 20 years
20 years -- 40 years

38

34.9%

15
9
14

39.5%
23.7%
36.8%

Members with Top Management Experience
Years of Top Management Experience
1 - 10 years
> 10 years - 20 years
> 20 years - 40 years

90

82.6%

31
35
24

33.3%
38.9%
26.7%

Industry Experience
Banking/Financial Services
31
Pharma/Medical/Healthcare
26
Energy/Oil & Gas
19
Accounting
7
Manufacturing
7
Real Estate
7
Telecommunications/Media
7
Other Areas Reported by less than 5% of participants

28.4%
23.9%
17.4%
6.4%
6.4%
6.4%
6.4%

Job Title
President/CEO
56
Vice President
39
CFO
19
Partner (BIG 4, Law, Investment)
15
Chairman
14
Investor/Investment Advisor
8
Lawyer
7
Other Job Titles Reported by less than 3% of participants

51.4%
35.8%
17.4%
13.8%
12.8%
7.3%
6.4%

Number of Audit Committees Currently Served
0 (Recently Resigned)
1
2
3
4-7

2
58
26
15
8

1.8%
53.3%
23.9%
13.8%
7.3%

Total Number of Audit Committees Ever Served
1
2
3
4
5
6-11

35
20
18
10
11
14

32.4%
18.5%
16.7%
9.3%
10.2%
13.0%
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Approximate Annual Revenues of Largest Audit Committee Served
Under $250 million
36
$250 - 500 million
18
$501 1 billion
16
Over
1 billion
37
No Answer
2

33.6%
16.8%
15.0%
34.6%
1.8%

Years of Audit Committee Experience
2
3-5
6-10
11-16
20-45

3
38
33
21
14

2.8%
34.8%
30.3%
19.3%
12.8%

Boards that have Implemented Audit Firm Rotation

21

19.3%

______________________________________________________________________________________________

Perceptions of the Case Instrument
Participants were asked to assess the case instrument in terms of realism,
understandability, and difficulty. The case instrument perceptions were all assessed on an
11-point scale, with endpoints “Not at All Realistic”, “Not at All Understandable”, and
“Not at All Difficult” at 0, and “Very Realistic”, Very Understandable”, and “Very
Difficult” at 10. The realism mean of 5.4 out of 10 (SD = 2.56) is not significantly
different from the scale midpoint of 5 (p = 0.104), although neither the review of the case
materials by academic researchers nor the pretest revealed any issues with case realism.
There is, in fact, a wide distribution for the case realism assessment, and comments are
provided by participants at each end of the spectrum. At the low end, some participants
commented that the issue in the case would not reach the audit committee and would be
settled by management and the audit firm. At the other end, some participants felt the
case was very realistic. The wide array of comments most likely reflects the difference in
audit committee experiences between companies. Respondents found the case
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understandable (mean = 8.0, SD = 1.64) and not difficult (mean = 3.3, SD = 2.44). Both
the understandability and difficulty assessments are significantly different from the
midpoint (p <= 0.001 for both), and the case difficulty assessment is significantly
correlated (r = 0.279, p < 0.01) with the assessment of case realism.
Dependent Variable Analysis
The dependent variables in the case are the participants’ assessment of the audit
firm’s characteristics of expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability, and the
measure of support the respondent provides for the audit firm proposed adjustment. The
dependent variables will be discussed in the order of the related hypotheses. The audit
firm characteristics are assessed based on 11-point scale responses to four statements
each for the four characteristic constructs. An integrity characteristic construct is also
measured, although no hypothesis was put forth for integrity since it is not expected to be
influenced by the manipulations in the case. The scales are labeled with endpoints
“Strongly Disagree” at 0 and “Strongly Agree” and 10. A “Neutral” label is provided at
the midpoint. Participants were asked to place a slash (/) on the line to indicate their
response.10 Consistent with DeZoort et al. (2012), certain of the 20 statements for the
audit firm characteristics are reverse coded.
The support variable is assessed by asking respondents who they favor in the
accounting dispute, recorded on an 11-point scale anchored with “Favor Management
(No Adjustment)” at the 0 point, “Neutral” at the midpoint, and “Favor Audit Firm
(Record Adjustment)” at the 10 point. Respondents were also asked to indicate who the
“typical” audit committee member would favor in the disagreement as a way to deal with
10

Responses were recorded to the tenth between the horizontal markers; while participants were asked to
make slash marks on the scales, approximately 26% of the participants marked the scales in another
manner, with 13 marking an “x”, 12 circling a scale point, and 3 using a checkmark or arrow.
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social desirability bias (SDB). Fisher (1993) examined the tendency of individuals to give
responses to survey questions based on what they perceived a socially acceptable answer
should be. Asking the same question in the indirect format is designed to illicit the true
perceptions of the participant. The use of the indirect questioning technique resulted in an
alternate dependent variable for support labeled typical support.
Results of a pairwise t-test indicate that the means of support and typical support
are not statistically different (p = 0.106), although quite close to marginally different.
Further, when considered by experimental condition, there is marginal evidence of a
difference between support and typical support in the required rotation condition (n = 46;
p = 0.087).11 In this condition, the mean of support is 4.37, versus 4.80 for typical
support, indicating that typical audit committee members would be more supportive of
the auditor than the participant supplying the assessment would be.12 To better
understand any bias implied by the participants, I consider both support and typical
support in the subsequent analyses, as well as a BIAS measure, which reflects the
difference between the support and typical support measures for each participant.
Descriptive statistics for the five dependent variables, plus the alternate dependent typical
support, are shown in Table 7.
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Variable
n
Min
Max
Expertise
109
3.25
10
Independence
109
3.50
10
Objectivity
109
3.50
10
Reliability
109
0.00
10
Support
109
0.20
10
11

Mean
7.75
7.95
7.74
6.77
4.48

Std. Dev
1.65
1.22
1.37
1.58
2.47

All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise indicated.
One might expect SDB to cause participants to view themselves as more supportive of the auditor than
less supportive due to the emphasis on audit committee independence from management promoted by
SOX. In this case setting, most of the participants sided with management, making the SDB effect more
difficult to interpret.
12
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Typical Support
108
11-point scales, 0-10

0.00

10

4.79

2.38

The dependent variables for the audit firm characteristics are averages of the
responses for the four measurement questions for each construct. The means of the audit
firm characteristic constructs are all significantly different from the midpoint of 5 (p < =
0.01), indicating that respondents in general assessed the audit firm as having expertise,
independence, objectivity, and reliability above the neutral position. Reliability is the
only characteristic for which the participants assessed the full range of 0 to 10, although
only one participant assessed audit firm reliability at a score of 0.
I used Cronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of the multiple item measures.
Expertise has a measurement reliability of 0.89, objectivity of 0.75, and the audit firm
characteristic reliability of 0.75, all of these above the suggested minimum of 0.70 (Hair,
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Cronbach’s alpha for independence was 0.62, below
the suggested level, implying that the four separate independence measures are not
necessarily a stronger measure of independence when combined. The mean of support for
the audit firm adjustment is also significantly different from the midpoint of 5 (p =
0.029), while the mean of typical support is not significantly different from the neutral
position (p = 0.366). Of the 109 participants, 57 (52.3%) assessed their level of support
for the auditor proposed adjustment between 0—“Favor Management (No
Adjustment),”—and the Neutral position at the scale midpoint of 5; 17 participants
(15.6%) assessed their support at neutral; 35 participants (32.1%) assessed support at
more than neutral to a high of 10—“Favor Audit Firm (Record Adjustment).”13

13

Participants were asked about their level of concern for an audit firm resignation or audit fee increase if
they did not support the audit firm position (0 “Not a Concern” and 10 “Significant Concern”) for both
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The result of correlation analysis among the five continuous dependent variables
supports the use of multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA). The results of the
correlations for the dependent variables expertise, independence, objectivity, reliability,
and support are shown in Table 8, and correlations when “typical” support is substituted
for support are shown in Table 9.
Table 8 Dependent Variables Correlation Matrix with Support (n =109)
Item
Expertise Independence Objectivity Reliability
Expertise
Independence
.373**
Objectivity
.594**
.514**
Reliability
.508**
.190*
.383**
Support
.273**
.076
.189*
.577**
Pearson Correlation; ** Significant at 0.01 level; *Significant at 0.05 level
Table 9 Dependent Variables Correlation Matrix with Typical Support (n =108)
Item
Expertise Independence Objectivity Reliability
Expertise
Independence
.373**
Objectivity
.594**
.514**
Reliability
.508**
.190*
.383**
Typical Support .112
.110
.070
.416**
Pearson correlation; ** Significant at 0.01 level; *Significant at 0.05 level
The correlation matrix using the support dependent variable shows significant
correlations (p < = 0.05) between nine pairs of the dependent variables, and one pair with
a correlation lacking significance. When typical support is substituted for the support
dependent variable, correlations between seven pairs of dependent variables retain
significance (p < = 0.05), and three pairs show no significant correlation. Overall, the
significant correlation results are consistent with using the five dependent variables
together in a MANCOVA.
MANCOVA Analysis
questions. The means for concern about audit firm resignation (3.98) and fee increase (1.43) were both
significantly different from the midpoint (p < = 0.01), reflecting relatively low levels of concern.
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The two manipulated independent variables were included in the MANCOVA
model with the five dependent variables. Several demographic variables were tested as
possible covariates, and the three variables suggested by prior research were retained in
the model. Two continuous variables (i.e., number of years of audit committee experience
and number of years of top management experience) and one categorical variable (CPA
status) are retained as covariates in the model. Descriptive data for the continuous
covariates are shown in Table 10. The mean for years of audit committee experience is
9.9 years, considerably above the minimum of two years’ experience required for
participation in the study. The mean for years of management experience is 13.3, with 19
participants reporting no management experience.
Table 10 Descriptive Data for Continuous Covariates
Covariate
Min
Max
Years of Audit
Committee Experience
2
45
Years of Management
Experience
0
40

Mean

Std. Dev

9.931

7.5306

13.29

10.255

The continuous variables were tested for skewness, and the number of years of
audit committee experience tested positive for skewness (p < 0.001). Therefore, the
natural log of the number of years of audit committee experience variable was computed
and used in all models. The MANCOVA model is shown below:
(Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Support) = ƒ (rotation, tenure,
rotation x tenure, natural log of #years AC experience, #years of management
experience, CPA status)
The MANCOVA model in Table 11 is significant (F =1.78, p = 0.008). CPA
status is significant in the model (F = 3.552, p = 0.005), and auditor tenure is significant
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(F = 2.50, p = 0.035). A second MANCOVA was run using typical support.14 This model,
shown in Table 12, is also significant (p = 0.011), and auditor tenure (F = 2.67, p =
0.027) and CPA status (F = 3.412, p = 0.007) show similar significance in this second
MANCOVA model.15
Table 11 MANCOVA Results (Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Support)
Item
F
p-value**
Audit Firm Tenure
2.500
0.035
Audit Firm Rotation
1.637
0.157
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
0.742
0.594
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1.551
0.181
Years of Management Experience
0.840
0.524
CPA
3.552
0.005
Corrected Model*
1.780
0.008
Intercept
94.173
0.000
*Wilk’s Lambda Reported ** Two-tailed p-value

Table 12 MANCOVA Results (Expertise, Independence, Objectivity, Reliability, Typical
Support)
Item
F
p-value**
Audit Firm Tenure
2.666
0.027
Audit Firm Rotation
1.032
0.403
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
0.775
0.570
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1.473
0.206
Years of Management Experience
0.890
0.491
CPA
3.412
0.007
Corrected Model*
1.730
0.011
Intercept
91.365
0.000
*Wilk’s Lambda Reported **Two-tailed p-value
ANCOVA Analyses
Individual ANCOVA models were then run for each of the dependent variables
separately to test hypotheses 1 through 5. For the models below, I first present and
14

A third MANCOVA model run to include BIAS (participant’s personal response less typical audit
committee member response) is significant, and BIAS is significant in this additional model (F = 6.161, p <
0.001). The CPA covariate (F = 3.289, p = 0.009) and audit firm tenure (F = 2.844, p = (0.019) retain their
significance.
15
Analysis using n = 120, which includes participants who failed the manipulation checks or provided
straight-line responses, provides similar MANCOVA results.
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discuss the dependent variable means by condition and then present the ANCOVA
results.
The first dependent variable tested with ANCOVA was the audit firm
characteristic expertise. The expertise construct is designed to measure the audit firm
professionals’ technical knowledge, ability, and experience to achieve task-specific
superior performance. Mean data for expertise are provided in Table 13.
Table 13 Means for Hypothesis 1 (Audit Firm Expertise)
(0 low to 10 high)
(n = 109)
Audit Firm
Required
Not Required
Rotation
Audit Firm
Tenure
Short
Mean
7.92
7.18
Std. Dev.
1.37
1.96
N
21
30
Long
Mean
8.30
7.74
Std. Dev.
1.49
1.50
N
25
33
Mean
8.13
7.48
Total
Std. Dev.
1.43
1.75
N
46
63

Total

7.48
1.77
51
7.99
1.51
58
7.75
1.65
109

The difference in the mean value of expertise between the short (7.48) and long
(7.99) tenure groups is marginally significant based on a one-tailed16 independent sample
t-test (p = 0.056), consistent with H1a, but the reader is cautioned that in the ANCOVA
below it is insignificant. The difference in means between the required rotation (8.13) and
no required rotation group (7.48) is significant (p = 0.041), based on a two-tailed
independent sample t-test, but it is opposite of the predicted direction. I predicted that
required rotation would decrease assessment of expertise, as the limited engagement
period would decrease the audit firm’s incentive to build firm specific expertise.
16

P-values for t-tests are one-tailed if in the direction predicted in a hypothesis, else two-tailed; for
conservatism, all ANCOVA p-values are two-tailed.
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However, when audit firm rotation is required, the expertise assessment is higher than
when no rotation is required. The Levene Test shows no heteroscadasticity for
expertise.17
The results of the ANCOVA model for expertise are shown in Table 14. The
ANCOVA model for expertise is significant (F = 2.512, p = 0.026). Audit firm tenure is
not significant (F = 2.096, p = 0.151) in the ANCOVA model, despite the tentative
support provided by the difference in the means. An explanation for the lack of a
significant difference in the mean level of expertise between short and long tenure could
lie in the high level of expertise assessment by all participants in general. The mean level
of expertise is significantly higher than the midpoint of 5 (p < 0.01), which likely results
from the audit firm in the case being identified as a Big 4 firm. A smaller firm most likely
lacks the imputed benefits of being a Big 4 firm and requires more years of experience to
achieve a high assessment of expertise, while a Big 4 firm has reputational attribution of
expertise.
Audit firm rotation is significant (F = 5.379, p = 0.022) in the expertise ANCOVA
model. While H1b predicted that the rotation manipulation would influence the
assessment of expertise, I predicted that the no rotation requirement group would assess
expertise higher than the when rotation required group. The data show that the expertise
assessment is higher when rotation is required. The increased expertise assessment under
board imposed rotation is counter to the prior literature and the basis of the
expertise/independence trade-off, which both link rotation to reduced assessments of
expertise. When considering the ANOVA model, there is no support for H1a, which

17

All of the dependent variables were tested in the same manner, and no evidence of heteroscadasticity was
found.
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predicts that longer tenure will positively influence the assessment of expertise. The
covariate CPA status is significant (F = 5.324, p = 0.023), and CPAs (mean = 8.15) rate
audit firm expertise higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.51).
Table 14 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 1 (Dependent Variable Audit Firm Expertise)
Df
Mean
F
p-value**
Squared
Audit Firm Tenure (H1a)
1
5.249
2.096
0.151
Audit Firm Rotation (H1b)
1 13.468
5.379
0.022
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
1
1.346
0.537
0.465
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1
0.073
0.029
0.865
Years of Management Experience
1
6.548
2.615
0.109
CPA
1 13.330
5.324
0.023
Corrected Model*
6
6.290
2.512
0.026
Intercept
1 482.701 192.784
0.000
Error
102
2.504
Total
109
Corrected total
108
*R-Squared = 0.129 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.078) **Two-tailed p-value
Levene Test not significant (p = 0.171)

The next dependent variable tested with ANCOVA was the assessment of audit
firm independence. The independence characteristic is designed to measure the
perception of the audit firm’s independence from management, and the ability of the
audit firms’ professionals to withstand undue management pressure to influence financial
statement outcomes. Mean data for independence are shown in Table 15.
Table 15 Means for Hypothesis 2 (Audit Firm Independence)
(0 low to 10 high)
(n = 109)
Audit Firm
Required
Not Required
Rotation
Audit Firm
Tenure
Short
Mean
8.31
7.73
Std. Dev.
1.17
1.42
N
21
30
Long
Mean
7.84
8.02
Std. Dev.
1.32
.95

Total

7.97
1.34
51
7.94
1.12

51
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
N

Total

25
8.05
1.26
46

33
7.88
1.20
63

58
7.95
1.22
109

The difference in the mean value of independence between the short tenure (7.97)
and long tenure (7.94) groups is not significant (p = 0.463), based on a one-tailed t-test.
The difference in the mean between the required rotation (8.05) and no required rotation
group (7.88) is not significant (p = 0.469), based on a two-tailed independent sample ttest. These findings are inconsistent with H2a and H2b. The ANCOVA model is shown
in Table 16.
Table 16 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 2 (Audit Firm Independence)
df
Mean
F
Squared
Audit Firm Tenure (H2a)
1
0.192
0.136
Audit Firm Rotation (H2b)
1
1.413
1.001
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
1
4.562
3.231
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1
2.396
1.696
Years of Management Experience
1
1.003
0.710
CPA
1
9.014
6.383
Corrected Model*
6
2.869
2.032
Intercept
1
469.960 332.813
Error
102
1.412
Total
109
Corrected total
108
*R-Squared = 0.107 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.054) **Two-tailed p-value
Leven Test not significant (p = 0.232)

p-value**
0.713
0.320
0.075
0.196
0.401
0.013
0.068
0.000

The ANCOVA model for independence is marginally significant (p = 0.068). The
ANCOVA results also reveal a marginally significant interaction between tenure and
rotation at (p = 0.075). This disordinal18 interaction shows that the short tenure group is
influenced by the rotation condition more so than the long tenure group. Further, the short
tenure group assesses audit firm independence as higher when rotation is required, than

18

A test of contrasts indicates that rotation policy is marginally significant when tenure is short (p = 0.060).
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when rotation is not required. Therefore, limited support applying to the short tenure
group is found for H2b, which predicts that the required rotation group will assess
independence higher than the no rotation group.
The ANCOVA also shows significance (p = 0.013) for CPA status, and CPAs
(mean = 8.29) assess independence as higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.75). No support,
though, is found for H2a that predicted a main effect of the tenure manipulation on the
assessment of audit firm Independence.
The third ANCOVA model is for the dependent variable objectivity. The audit
firm characteristic objectivity measures the ability of the audit firm professionals to
manage cognitive biases and subjectivity that affect professional judgment. The mean
data for objectivity are shown in Table 17.
Table 17 Means for Hypothesis 3 (Audit Firm Objectivity)
(0 low to 10 high)
(n = 109)
Audit Firm
Required
Not Required
Rotation
Audit Firm
Tenure
Short
Mean
7.82
7.54
Std. Dev.
1.34
1.42
N
21
30
Long
Mean
7.96
7.69
Std. Dev.
1.48
1.28
N
25
33
Mean
7.90
7.62
Total
Std. Dev.
1.40
1.34
N
46
63

Total

7.66
1.38
51
7.80
1.36
58
7.74
1.37
109

The difference in the mean value of objectivity between the short tenure (7.66)
and long tenure (7.80) groups is not significant (p = 0.290) using a one-tailed t-test. The
difference in the mean between the required rotation (7.90) and no required rotation
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(7.62) groups is also not significant (p = 0.294).These findings are inconsistent with H3a
and H3b. The ANCOVA for objectivity is shown in Table 18.
Table 18 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 3 (Audit Firm Objectivity)
df
Mean
F
Squared
Audit Firm Tenure (H3a)
1
0.938
0.559
Audit Firm Rotation (H3b)
1
2.883
1.718
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
1
0.177
0.105
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1
0.119
0.071
Years of Management Experience
1
0.028
0.016
CPA
1
27.443
16.358
Corrected Model*
6
5.024
2.995
Intercept
1 478.496 285.486
Error
102
1.678
Total
109
Corrected total
108
*R-Squared = 0.15 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.100) **Two-tailed p-value
Leven Test not significant (p = 0.577)

p-value**
0.456
0.193
0.746
0.791
0.898
0.000
0.010
0.000

The ANCOVA model for objectivity is significant (p = 0.01), and shows no
significance for the effect of the tenure or rotation manipulation on the assessment of
objectivity. These results, then, provide no support for H3a and H3b, which predicted an
influence of audit firm tenure and rotation and the audit committee members’ assessment
of objectivity. CPA status is significant (p <= 0.001), showing that CPAs (mean = 8.36)
rate audit firm objectivity higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.36).
The fourth ANCOVA model is for the assessment of audit firm reliability. The
reliability construct is designed to measure the condition where stakeholders consistently
find the audit firm’s work and opinion credible and dependable. The mean data for
reliability are shown in Table 19.
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Table 19 Means for Hypothesis 4 (Audit Firm Reliability)
(0 low to 10 high)
(n = 109)
Audit Firm
Required
Not Required
Rotation
Audit Firm
Tenure
Short
Mean
6.48
6.03
Std. Dev.
1.08
1.72
N
21
30
Long
Mean
7.51
7.07
Std. Dev.
1.38
1.58
N
25
33
Mean
7.04
6.58
Total
Std. Dev.
1.34
1.72
N
46
63

Total

6.22
1.50
51
7.26
1.50
58
6.77
1.58
109

The difference in the mean value of reliability between the short tenure (6.22) and
long tenure (7.26) groups is significant in a one-tailed t-test (p < 0.01), consistent with
H4a. The mean difference between the required rotation (7.04) and no required rotation
(6.58) groups is not significant using a two-tailed t-test (p = 0.128), inconsistent with
H4b. Therefore, the tenure groups perceive audit firm reliability differently, with the long
tenure group assessing reliability higher.
In the earlier audit firm independence section, I explained a difference in the
perception of audit firm independence between the short and long tenure groups based on
the rotation manipulation. The point of considering mandatory audit firm rotation is
ultimately a potential increase in audit quality and audit firm reliability. A longer audit
firm tenure increases perception of audit firm reliability. Required rotation increases the
perception of audit firm independence for the short audit firm tenure group, but not for
the long tenure group. However, required rotation does not increase perceptions of audit
firm reliability for either tenure group. Presumably, the short tenure audit firms will
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achieve higher reliability assessments as their tenure increases, but not if required
rotation limits their ability to achieve a longer tenure.
The reliability ANCOVA model is shown in Table 20.
Table 20 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 4 (Audit Firm Reliability)
df
Mean
F
p-value**
Squared
Audit Firm Tenure (H4a)
1 26.921 11.832
0.001
Audit Firm Rotation (H4b)
1
5.872
2.581
0.111
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
1
0.125
0.055
0.815
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1
0.347
0.153
0.697
Years of Management Experience
1
1.233
0.542
0.463
CPA
1
0.853
0.375
0.542
Corrected Model*
6
6.216
2.732
0.017
Intercept
1 414.529 182.194
0.000
Error
102
2.275
Total
109
Corrected total
108
*R-Squared = 0.0138 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.088) **Two-tailed p-value
Levene test not significant (p = 0.623)
The reliability ANOVA is significant (p = 0.017) and audit firm tenure is
significant (p = 0.001). This means that audit firm tenure manipulation has a significant
influence over audit committee member assessment of audit firm reliability, with the long
tenure group perceiving greater reliability than the short tenure group. Audit firm rotation
is not significant (p = 0.111). These findings add to the support for H4a, but do not
support H4b, that predicted a relationship between required rotation and reliability.
The last of the ANOVA models relate to the support and typical support
dependent variables. These variables measure the level of support the audit committee
member participants indicated for the audit firm’s proposed adjustment. Mean data are
shown in Tables 21 and 22.
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Table 21 Means for Hypothesis 5 (Support for Audit Firm Adjustment)
(0 Supports Management to 10 Supports Audit Firm)
(n = 109)
Audit Firm
Required
Not Required
Total
Rotation
Audit Firm
Tenure
Short
Mean
4.45
3.99
4.18
Std. Dev.
2.52
2.30
2.38
N
21
29
50
Long
Mean
5.10
5.49
5.32
Std. Dev.
2.29
2.26
2.26
N
25
33
58
Mean
4.80
4.76
4.79
Total
Std. Dev.
2.39
2.38
2.38
N
46
62
108
Table 22 Means for Hypothesis 5 (Typical Support for Audit Firm Adjustment)
(0 Supports Management to 10 Supports Audit Firm)
(n = 108)
Audit Firm
Required
Not Required
Total
Rotation
Audit Firm
Tenure
Short
Mean
7.92
7.18
7.48
Std. Dev.
1.37
1.96
1.77
N
21
30
51
Long
Mean
8.30
7.74
7.99
Std. Dev.
1.49
1.50
1.51
N
25
33
58
Mean
8.13
7.48
7.75
Total
Std. Dev.
1.43
1.75
1.65
N
46
63
109
The difference in the mean of support between the short tenure (4.18) and long
tenure (5.32) groups is significant using a one-tailed t-test (p = 0.022), as is the difference
in the mean of typical support (p = 0.006) between the short (7.48) and long tenure (7.99)
groups. This finding provides support for H5a, which posits that the level of support for
the audit firm will be higher when audit firm tenure is long, as opposed to short. The
difference in the mean support between the required rotation (4.80) and no required
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rotation (4.76) groups is not significant (p = 0.702), based on a two-tailed t-test. For
typical support, the difference in the mean between the required rotation (8.13) and no
required rotation (7.48) groups is not significant (p = 0.971) using a two-tailed t-test. This
finding provides no support for H5b, which predicted that audit committee member
support for the audit firm would increase when rotation was not required. The ANCOVA
models for support and typical support are shown in Tables 23 & 24.
Table 23 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 5 (Support for the Audit Firm Adjustment)
df
Mean
F
p-value**
Squared
Audit Firm Tenure (H5a)
1
23.132
3.858
0.052
Audit Firm Rotation (H5b)
1
1.124
0.187
0.666
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
1
0.036
0.006
0.938
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1
15.947
2.660
0.106
Years of Management Experience
1
0.002
0.000
0.986
CPA
1
2.792
0.466
0.497
Corrected Model*
6
7.452
1.243
0.291
Intercept
1
90.566
15.104
0.000
Error
102
5.996
Total
109
Corrected total
108
*R-Squared = 0.068 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.013) **Two-tailed p-value
Levene Test not significant (p = 0.314)

Table 24 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 5 (Typical Support for the Audit Firm Adjustment)
df
Mean
F
p-value**
Squared
Audit Firm Tenure (alt test of H5a)
1
25.828
4.871
0.030
Audit Firm Rotation (alt test of H5b)
1
0.025
0.005
0.945
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
1
3.798
0.716
0.399
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1
22.183
4.184
0.043
Years of Management Experience
1
4.769
0.899
0.345
CPA
1
0.058
0.011
0.917
Corrected Model*
6
11.458
2.161
0.053
Intercept
1
88.813
16.751
0.000
Error
102
5.302
Total
109
Corrected total
108
*R-Squared = 0.114 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.061) **Two-tailed p-value
Levene Test not significant (p = 0.719)
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The ANCOVA model for support is not significant (p = 0.291), so no further
interpretation of the results is appropriate (audit firm tenure is significant at p = 0.052 in
this insignificant model). The ANCOVA model for typical support is significant (p =
0.053). In the typical support model, audit firm tenure is significant (F = 4.871, p =
0.030), providing support for H5a in this alternate test based on typical support. Audit
firm rotation is not significant, so H5b, which predicted increased support for the audit
firm when rotation was not required, is not supported. The covariate for natural log of
audit committee experience is significant (p = 0.043). This significance indicates that
audit committee members with more audit committee experience show increased support
for the audit firm and the proposed adjustment, as confirmed by a positive correlation (r =
0.217, p = 0.024).
Based on my earlier discussion of SDB, I calculated a new variable BIAS for the
difference between support and typical support to measure the difference in the individual
observations. I added this BIAS variable as a covariate to the support ANCOVA model to
control for the impact of a socially desirable response effect. This ANCOVA model is
shown in Table 25. The ANCOVA model for support with the BIAS variable as a
covariate is significant (F = 5.121, p < 0.001). The BIAS covariate is also significant (p <
0.001). Audit firm tenure and years of audit committee experience retain their
significance in this alternate model, providing support for H5a.
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Table 25 ANCOVA for Hypothesis 5 (Support for the Audit Firm Adjustment with BIAS))
df
Mean
F
p-value**
Squared
Audit Firm Tenure (H5a)
1
24.054
5.026
0.027
Audit Firm Rotation (H5b)
1
0.154
0.032
0.858
Audit Firm Tenure x Audit Firm Rotation
1
1.385
0.290
0.592
Natural Log of Years of AC Experience
1
19.215
4.015
0.048
Years of Management Experience
1
1.582
0.331
0.567
CPA
1
0.363
0.076
0.783
BIAS
1
128.821 26.918
0.000
Corrected Model*
6
24.506
5.121
0.000
Intercept
1
90.206 18.849
0.000
Error
100
4.786
Total
108
Corrected total
107
*R-Squared = 0.264 (Adjusted R-Squared = 0.212) **Two-tailed p-value
To summarize the results of the testing,19 the audit firm tenure manipulation
(short or long) has no significant effect on the participants’ assessment of audit firm
expertise, independence, or objectivity. Although the ANCOVA model for support is not
significant, the alternate model controlling for the social desirability bias is significant,
and shows that longer audit firm tenure and more years of audit committee experience
increase support for the audit firm. The audit firm tenure manipulation does result in
participants in the long tenure group assessing audit firm reliability higher than the short
tenure group (p = 0.001), and the long tenure group reporting that the “typical” audit
committee member would provide more support for the audit firm’s proposed adjustment

19

Sensitivity testing was conducted using the participants’ perceptions of the case instrument by adding
realism, difficulty, and understandability as covariates (one at a time); with only understandability showing
significance in the MANCOVA model (p < 0.001). Understandability was also significantly correlated with
audit firm expertise (r = 0.280, p = .003), independence (r = 0.335, p < 0.001), objectivity (r = 0.493, p <
0.001), and reliability (r = 0.266, p = 0.005). The ANCOVA models were then re-run with the
understandability variable included as a covariate. The understandability covariate was significant in the
four audit firm characteristics models, but not in the support or typical support models. With
understandability included, the other results were qualitatively similar to the basic findings reported (CPA
is marginally significant in two models, where it had p < 0.05 without understandability included).
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(p = 0.03). Therefore, statistical support is found for H4a and in the alternate testing of
H5a (the typical support ANCOVA and the support ANCOVA with BIAS included).
The rotation manipulation (required or not required) results in a significant
difference in the mean between groups (p = 0.022) on the assessment of audit firm
expertise (H1b), although the required rotation group assessed expertise higher than the
no rotation group, when the opposite was predicted. The rotation manipulation does not
have a significant direct effect on assessments of audit firm objectivity or reliability. A
marginally significant (p = 0.075) interaction effect of the tenure and rotation
manipulation is found for independence, resulting in the short tenure group providing a
higher assessment of independence when audit firm rotation is required. Overall, the
hypotheses related to auditor rotation are not supported, although the interaction effect
does provide very limited support for H2b.
Two covariates are identified as having an impact on the dependent variables.
CPA status has a significant effect on assessments of audit firm expertise (p = 0.023),
independence (p = 0.013), and objectivity (p < 0.001), with CPAs more positive about the
audit firm than non-CPAs.20 A favorable audit firm bias from audit committee members
with CPA status provides incentive for companies to consider CPA status when
nominating audit committee members. These CPA audit committee members potentially
provide a balance to management pressure on the audit committee. The number of years
of audit committee experience (natural log) has a significant positive effect (p = 0.043)
on typical support, and on support with the BIAS covariate included (p = 0.048). Thus,

20

A similar ANCOVA model for the audit firm integrity characteristic is marginally significant (p = 0.06),
and shows a significant positive effect (p < 0.001) for CPA status; CPAs (mean = 8.17) rate audit firm
integrity higher than non-CPAs (mean = 7.57).
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there is some evidence that more experienced audit committee members provide greater
support to the audit committee, another factor that companies may consider.
Descriptive Statistics for Participants’ Assessment of Management Characteristics
While the case manipulations were designed to influence perceptions about the
audit firm, the support question calls for audit committee member judgment involving the
audit firm and management. Audit committee members most likely formed an opinion of
both the audit firm and management while reading the case materials. Characteristics of
management were not manipulated in the case; therefore, all participants were provided
the same facts regarding management. Participants were asked to rate management’s
credibility and experience, as well as the amount of pressure management was under to
meet the analysts’ EPS expectation. Participants found management to be credible (mean
= 6.69, SD = 1.70), experienced (mean = 6.89, SD = 1.59), and under considerable
earnings pressure (mean = 7.14, SD = 1.85). All of the means are significantly different
than the midpoint of 5 (p < = 0.01). Table 26 provides descriptive statistics for the
management characteristic assessments, and this information is helpful in considering the
judgment rationales provided in the next section.
Table 26 Descriptive Statistics for Management Characteristics
Characteristic
n
Min
Max
Mean
a
Credibility
109
2.0
9.5
6.69

Std.Dev.
1.70

Experienceb

108

1.0

9.5

6.89

1.59

Pressurec

109

.60

10

7.14

1.85

a

Credibility was assessed on an 11 point scale anchored by “Not at all Credible” and “Very Credible.”
Experience was assessed on an 11 point scale anchored by “Not at all Experienced” and “Very
Experienced.”
c
Pressure felt by management to meet analysts’ EPS expectation was assessed on an 11 point scale
anchored by “None” to “A Great Deal.”
b
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Participants’ Rationale for Support Decision
The auditor/management dispute in the case was designed to be subjective,
requiring the use of judgment by the audit committee member participants in making
their support decision. Audit committee member participants were asked to provide a
rationale for their support decision with the question, “What factors account for your
response?” The previous discussion of participants’ assessments of audit firm
characteristics and management characteristics provides a foundation for a discussion of
the rationales provided.
A total of 52 participants listed an accounts receivable factor or metric (e.g., days
sales’ outstanding, customer credit rating) as justification for their support decision.
Providing some evidence that the case information was balanced, 23 participants cited an
accounts receivable factor or metric in support of the audit firm, three participants cited
the same in the neutral support position, and 26 participants cited an accounts receivable
factor or metric in support of the management position.
The subjective nature of the dispute, and the need for judgment, were also cited
by audit committee members providing a range of support. The judgmental nature of the
issue was cited by one participant providing support for the audit firm, five participants
indicating a neutral support position, and eight participants who provided support for the
management position. The auditor position appears to have received the least benefit
from the subjective nature of the case. Continuing the discussion of the rationale for
support for the management position, 31 participants (28.4%) indicated a bias toward
management on the basis of business experience and/or having the best information, in
comparison to the audit firm, about the business and its customers. Seven participants
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cited a lack of persuasiveness of the audit firm’s case for recording the adjustment, and
four participants felt that the audit firm was too restrictive, too conservative, or too risk
averse. One participant cited the need to protect the company’s share price as rationale to
support management.
Twelve participants cited materiality as a basis for their support decision, eight of
whom provided support for the management position, one provided neutral support, and
three supported the audit firm. Participants supplemented the materiality justification
with the sentiment that further adjustment to bad debt expense could occur in later
periods if called for. Fifteen participants cited the need for more information, of which 10
provided neutral support, three supported the audit firm, and two supported management.
Fifteen participants noted a need to reach a compromise and acknowledged that good
points were presented by both the management and audit firm, of which 12 assessed
Support at neutral, two participants supported management, and one supported the audit
firm.
Thirty-five participants provided support for the audit firm position, indicating a
Support level above neutral. While 23 specifically mentioned accounts receivable
metrics, 11 participants attributed their support for the audit firm to the
expertise/independence of the audit firm. Accounting conservatism was cited by eight
participants who supported the audit firm, and six described a bias toward the audit firm’s
position. Six participants cited skepticism of management and/or earnings management
as a reason to support the audit firm, and one participant cited their duty to provide
oversight for shareholders.
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Table 27 summarizes the justification provided by participants for their Support
position, grouped by their level of support for the audit firm proposed adjustment from a
low of 0, “Favor Management (No Adjustment),” to Neutral at the scale midpoint of 5, to
a high of 10, “Favor Audit Firm (Record Adjustment).”
Table 27 Justification for Support
________________________________________________________________________
Justification
n
Panel A: Support For Management (Between 0 and Less Than 5) n=57
1.
Bias toward management business knowledge/experience
31
2.
Accounts receivable metrics and factors
26
3.
Audit firm position is not persuasive
10
4.
The support decision is based on judgment
8
5.
Materiality/Adjust next period
8
6.
Audit firm too restrictive, too conservative, too risk adverse
4
Panel B: Neutral Support (Support=5) n=17
1.
Management and audit firm both make good points
2.
More information needed to decide on support level
3.
The support decision issue is based on judgment

12
10
5

Panel C: Support for the Audit Firm (Over 5 and up to 10) n=35
1.
Accounts receivable metrics and factors
2.
Audit firm expertise and/or independence (objectivity)
3.
Conservatism
4.
Tend to support the audit firm in disputes
5.
Skeptical of management

23
11
7
6
6

Most of the 109 participants provided more than one reason for their support.
One respondent made no response regarding the justification for their support decision.
___________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS,
LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study examines the effects of audit firm tenure (short or long) and audit firm
rotation (required or not required) on public company audit committee members’ support
for an audit firm proposed adjustment on a subjective accounting issue. I predicted that
longer audit firm tenure and no required rotation would increase the level of support for
the audit firm proposed adjustment. Perceptions of audit firm characteristics were
examined to help to understand and interpret the results. The audit firm characteristics are
adopted from an auditor reliability framework (DeZoort et al., 2012), and include
expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity and reliability, although no hypothesis was
offered for the relationship between audit firm tenure/rotation and integrity.
The primary results indicate that longer audit firm tenure results in higher
perceptions of audit firm reliability, and participants believe that the typical audit
committee member would be more supportive of longer tenured auditors. When
controlling for social desirability bias, the long tenure group provided more support for
the audit firm proposed adjustment than the short tenure group. Participants with more
years of audit committee experience were more supportive of the audit firm. The required
rotation group assessed audit firm expertise higher than the no rotation group. A
marginally significant interaction between audit firm tenure and rotation resulted in the
short tenure group assessing audit firm independence higher when rotation was required
than when rotation was not required. The hypotheses predicting differences in the
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responses for objectivity, reliability, and support based on audit firm rotation
(required/not required) are not supported. CPA status is associated with increased
perceptions of auditor expertise, independence, and objectivity, suggesting that audit
committee members that have CPA status have more favorable views of audit firms than
non-CPAs.
The use of a subjective accounting issue in the experimental case invited the use
of judgment by participants in deciding on a level of support for the audit firm proposed
adjustment. An examination of the justification provided by participants for their support
decision provides insight into the audit committee process. In this study, audit firm tenure
(short or long) does not influence public company audit committee members’ perceptions
of auditor expertise, but participants in the longer tenure group provided more support for
the audit firm proposed adjustment. Audit firm rotation (required/not required) influences
perceptions of audit firm independence for participants in the short tenure group. Out of
108 participants providing a rationale for their support decision, 11 (10%) cited audit firm
expertise, independence, or objectivity as a reason for their support of the auditor.
Conservatism, a tendency to support the external audit firm, and skepticism of
management were cited by other participants who supported the audit firm.
For the 52.3% of participants (57 participants) who supported the management
position, neither audit firm independence nor expertise (or a lack thereof) was cited as a
reason to support management. The justification provided by participants who supported
management centered on a belief that management knows the business and the customers
better than the audit firm, and the audit firm did not provide a compelling argument to
override management’s position. Prior research has supported that subjective accounting
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issue adjustments are waived more often than objective ones (Braun, 2001; Nelson,
Elliot, & Tarpley, 2002; Wright & Wright, 1997), and that audit firms are at a
disadvantage to management on subjective issues (Deis & Giroux, 1992). The results of
the current study suggest that the audit firm in the case was at a disadvantage to public
company audit committee members when a subjective issue resulted in a dispute.
Comments provided by almost a third of the audit committee member participants of the
current study suggest an audit committee member bias toward management that the audit
firm must overcome with a strong and persuasive case.
DeZoort et al. (2008) found that audit committee members seemed more
supportive of the audit firm in accounting disputes with management post-SOX,
compared with the pre-SOX period. Kaplan & Mauldin (2008) reported that audit
committee members tend to support the audit firm in many experimental judgment
studies, although that level of support does vary with the conditions presented and the
type of manipulations. The comments provided by audit committee members in this case
suggest a change in that trend, as a majority of participants supported management –
although I acknowledge that the case materials differ across studies. Further research
focused on audit committee member biases is required to help interpret the implication
regarding a potential audit committee member pro-management bias.
This study has some limitations related to the experimental design. In an attempt
to isolate the manipulated variables, the case seemed unrealistic to some participants. The
delivery method using the USPS and finding addresses through publicly available
information resulted in the return of case materials for lack of deliverability, which can
reduce the sample’s representativeness of the population. Experimental findings are not
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always generalizable to other populations, other accounting disputes, or different
accounting regulation environments.
The results have implications for public policy, practice, and future research. In
terms of public policy, mandatory audit firm rotation for U.S. companies has been
discussed as a means of increasing auditor independence, although the trade-off is
suggested to be a decline in the perception of audit firm expertise. In this study of audit
committee member judgment for mid-size U.S. firms, audit firm rotation increased the
perception of independence for short tenure audit firms, but not for longer tenure audit
firms. Required rotation did, though, increase the level of perceived expertise for all audit
firms, a result counter to the predicted effect and prior literature. However, mandatory
rotation does not impact audit quality measured by audit firm reliability, nor result in
increased support for the audit firm over management in accounting disputes. As the
auditor reliability framework suggests, audit firm reliability should be the goal of public
policy. Longer audit firm tenure is supported in this study as a primary factor in audit
committee perception of audit firm reliability.
The findings of this study will also inform policy makers and corporate boards on
public company audit committee member awareness of the pressure on management to
manipulate earnings. The dispute in the experimental case centered on subjective
accounting issues that require estimation and judgment, focused on accounts that can be
used for earnings manipulation, and presented evidence of an earnings management
incentive in the potential to miss an EPS estimate. While some study participants (13.8%)
stated a need for more information in the case, and six (5.5%) expressed skepticism of
management, the majority of participants (52%) supported management and made no
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mention of a possible earnings management issue. Combined with a possible implied promanagement bias, a lack of awareness of a condition suggestive of an earnings
manipulation issue indicates a potential for decreased vigilance of some audit committee
members against management earnings manipulation.
Many participants offered comments to provide more information on public
company audit committee processes. Additional qualitative research conducted through
in-depth interviews of audit committee members about changing processes would add to
the accounting literature, as changing regulatory and professional environments impact
the audit committee process. PCAOB (AS 16, para 22) requires audit committee
members to be apprised of contentious accounting issues, even if they are settled,
between the audit firm and management. Comments provided by participants in this
study suggest many audit committee members are involved in the external audit process
and in communication with the audit firm as proposed adjustments are considered. The
results of this study present questions regarding the continued impact of Sarbanes-Oxley
and other governance improvement measures on audit committee member independence
from—and perhaps biases toward—management, and on the objectivity of audit
committee members in general.
Implications of this study’s findings for public companies also extend to
characteristics of potential audit committee members. The results suggest that recruiting
CPAs as audit committee members will promote increased perceptions of audit firm
expertise and independence, and especially audit firm objectivity. Results also suggest
that recruiting audit committee members with more audit committee experience promotes
a more conservative attitude toward financial reporting. A review of the rationales
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provided by participants for their support decision implies that many audit committee
members are engaged in oversight of the external audit process. The findings suggest that
audit committee members relate increased audit firm tenure to audit firm reliability, and
provide more support for audit firms with longer tenure.
Further research is called for in several areas, including audit firm rotation. Audit
firm rotation mandated at the regulatory level is unlikely in the U.S. audit environment.
However, approximately 20% of the participants in this study reported that the companies
they serve have adopted mandatory audit firm rotation as a governance mechanism.
Future research into company mandated audit firm rotation would provide insights into
the cost and benefits of such a policy. Additional research into audit committee member
biases would also provide useful guidance to public companies in promoting effective
financial reporting. Finally, continued research into audit committee processes,
particularly external audit oversight and awareness of earnings management pressure,
would benefit stakeholders of public companies.
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Dana R. Hermanson
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise
dhermans@kennesaw.edu

February 6, 2016
Dear <<Title>> <<Last Name>>:
As you know, the role of audit committee members is quite complex and often
challenging. My doctoral student, Janice Rummell, is working on her dissertation, in
which she is seeking to better understand audit committee members’ judgments. Dr. Todd
DeZoort (The University of Alabama) and I are overseeing Janice’s research, and we are
both experienced accounting researchers. Janice is an experienced CPA, CMA, and
accounting professor.
You are among a select group of audit committee members we are contacting to ask for
assistance with Janice’s dissertation research. Your participation is very important to the
success of the project and to gain a better understanding of the issues and challenges that
audit committee members confront in practice. We certainly hope you will contribute a
few minutes of your time to help us in this area.
Completion of the enclosed case should take approximately 15-20 minutes. If you have
any questions or would like to receive a summary of the results, please contact either
Janice at jrummell@students.kennesaw.edu or me at dhermans@kennesaw.edu. Thank
you very much for your support of this research.
Sincerely,

Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D.
Enclosures: Letter from Janice Rummell, Case, Return Envelope
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RESEARCH STUDY:
Audit Committee Members’ Role in Accounting Dispute Resolution

Researcher’s Contact Information:
Janice E. Rummell, (814) 255-3335, jrummell@students.kennesaw.edu
You are being invited to take part in a research study that I am conducting as part of the requirements to
earn the Doctorate in Business Administration (DBA) in Accounting at Kennesaw State University. Before
you decide to participate in this study, you should read this form and ask questions about anything you do
not understand. All participants must be at least 18 years old. You can contact me using the contact
information above.
The study consists of a short case and a series of questions about the case, as well as questions about your
audit committee experiences. The purpose of the study is to better understand audit committee members’
role in accounting dispute resolution. Your position as a public company audit committee member, your
experience, and your expertise make your opinions and contribution very important to this study. The
estimated time for completion is 15-20 minutes.
Statement of Understanding for Participants
The purpose of this research has been explained and my participation is voluntary. I have the right to stop
participation at any time without penalty. I understand that the research has no known risks, and I will not
be identified. By completing this case, I am agreeing to participate in this research project.
THIS PAGE MAY BE REMOVED AND KEPT BY EACH PARTICIPANT.
Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight
of the Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to
the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, GA
30144-5591, (470) 578-2268.
Thank you for your time and assistance. Your participation in the research project is much appreciated, and
will contribute to our understanding of audit committee member judgment.

Janice E. Rummell

81

INSTRUCTIONS

1. The pages that follow contain a case and a series of questions. Some questions relate to the
case, and some questions are about your audit committee experiences and demographic
information.
2. Please read the case materials, and answer the questions without looking ahead through the
pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that
reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable response, please
complete all of the questions. You will have an opportunity at the end of the materials to
provide any comments or clarifications you would like to make.
3. When you have completed the questions, insert the case and questions into the pre-addressed
and stamped white envelope, seal it, and drop it into a USPS mailbox. Do not put your name
on the case or questions.
4. You are anonymous during this study. No effort will be made to link you to your responses
on the following pages.

RESEARCHER

Janice E. Rummell, CPA, CMA
Doctoral Student – Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University
jrummell@students.kennesaw.edu
(814) 255-3335

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Dana Hermanson, Ph. D. (Chair)
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair
& Professor of Accounting
Coles College of Business
Kennesaw State University
dhermanson@kennesaw.edu
(470) 578 - 6077

F. Todd DeZoort, Ph.D.
Durr-Fillauer Chair in Business Ethics
& Professor of Accounting
Culverhouse School of Accountancy
The University of Alabama
tdezoort@cba.ua.edu
(205) 348 - 6694
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Please read the information below and answer the questions that follow as if you are serving as an
audit committee member for AgPro, Inc.

Company and Industry Background
AgPro, Inc. is a publicly traded packaged foods company supplying grocery and commercial food
markets in the United States and around the world. The industry is very competitive and AgPro
competes on the basis of quality, value, customer service, and brand recognition and brand
loyalty. Consolidation in the supermarket, warehouse club, and wholesale industries has resulted
in increased ability of customers to negotiate favorable terms with AgPro, including increased
discounts and extended payment periods. One big-box retailer accounts for almost 18% of
AgPro’s total sales. Total sales revenue has decreased slightly in the past two fiscal years due to a
combination of lower unit sales and price reductions designed to remain competitive.

Financial Profile
For the current fiscal year, relevant pre-audit balances are as follows:
Sales
Total Assets
Accounts Receivable
Net Income
Earnings per Share (EPS)
Analysts’ Consensus EPS Forecast

$650 million
$550 million
$83 million
$14 million
$1.40
$1.39

Bad Debt Expense
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
Write-offs of Bad Debt

$1.4 million
$2.45 million
$1.1 million

Management Team and Financial Reporting
The CEO of AgPro has been in the position for 6 years, and the CFO has been in the position for
5 years. Both are known and respected in the industry. Management faces pressure to meet
performance targets, including analysts’ estimates for Earnings per Share (EPS), at a level that is
common for companies in the industry.

Audit Committee
AgPro’s audit committee, on which you serve, has four members, one of whom is designated as a
financial expert. The audit committee meets a minimum of four times per year, but meets more
often as required to carry out its duties. The audit committee members are independent of the
company’s management. The audit committee reviews all audit firm proposed adjustments. As a
member of the audit committee, part of your responsibilities includes helping resolve any
accounting disagreements between AgPro’s management and the external audit firm.
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External Audit Firm Tenure and Continuance
The following information pertains to the external audit firm engaged at AgPro:







AgPro has engaged a Big 4 audit firm that offers a wide array of accounting and auditing
services through its network of offices. The audit firm provides AgPro with audit services
and board approved tax preparation services.
This is the 3rd year (or 10th year) the audit firm has been engaged by AgPro.
The audit firm has previously issued standard, unqualified (clean) audit reports for the
company.
A Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Policy has been implemented by AgPro’s Board of
Directors after a review of corporate policy. Thus, the audit firm’s tenure with AgPro is
now limited. This policy means that the audit committee must replace the current audit
firm in two years.
OR
No Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Policy has been implemented by AgPro’s Board
of Directors, so the audit firm’s tenure with AgPro is not limited in any way. The
audit committee and the audit firm can choose to continue or discontinue the engagement
at any time.

Accounting Issue before the Audit Committee
The current year’s audit is in its final stages, and one disagreement over an audit firm proposed
adjustment has been brought to the audit committee’s attention. The issue below will be discussed
at the next audit committee meeting, held prior to releasing annual financial information.
The disagreement relates to Accounts Receivable, Bad Debt Expense, and the related Allowance
for Doubtful Accounts. Management recorded a Bad Debt Expense of $1,400,000. The audit
firm feels strongly that this amount is too low and has proposed an adjustment to increase this
amount by $350,000 to $1,750,000. The adjustment of $350,000 is 2.5% of Net Income.
Recording the audit firm’s proposed adjustment would reduce EPS from $1.40 to $1.37, below
the analysts’ consensus EPS forecast of $1.39.
The audit firm’s basis for proposing an adjustment to increase the Bad Debt Expense includes:





The net Accounts Receivable balance is going up as a percentage of total assets, despite a
slight decrease in Sales Revenue.
An aging schedule based on prior bad debt experience suggests that management’s
estimate of Bad Debt Expense is below the audit firm’s estimate of a reasonable range.
The Days Outstanding in Accounts Receivable has increased by 4 days, from 31 days to
35 days. The audit firm considers this to be a material change.
Average credit ratings of major customers are on the decline.

Management strongly disagrees with the audit firm’s proposed adjustment and argues that:




The Bad Debt Expense reflects a similar percentage of Sales Revenue as in prior years.
At least one major customer has leveraged its negotiating position and has slowed
payments by several days, but with no increase in collectability risk.
This year’s beginning balance of Allowance for Doubtful Accounts had grown in relation
to bad debt write-offs over the past few years.
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For the past several years, the ratio of Bad Debt Expense to write-offs of bad debt has
been greater than 1, suggesting an overestimation of Bad Debt Expense.
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Please answer the following questions based on the information in the case above. You may refer
back to the case information when responding. Place a slash anywhere on the line to indicate your
response.

1. Based on the information provided, who do you favor in this accounting disagreement? (Place
a slash ( / ) anywhere on the line below)

Favor
Management
(No Adjustment)

Neutral

Favor Audit Firm
(Record
Adjustment)

2. What factors account for your response to question #1 above?
a. ___________________________________________________________________
b. ___________________________________________________________________
c. ___________________________________________________________________
3. Based on the information provided, who do you think a typical audit committee member
would favor in this disagreement? (Place a slash on the line below)

Favor
Management
(No Adjustment)

Neutral

Favor Audit Firm
(Record Adjustment)

4. In audit firm/management dispute cases like the one in question #1 above, how much of a
concern is the possibility of the audit firm resigning if you don’t support the audit firm’s
position?

Not a Concern

Somewhat of
a Concern

Significant
Concern

5. In audit firm/management dispute cases like the one in question #1 above, how much of a
concern is the possibility of an audit fee increase if you don’t support the audit firm’s
position?

Not a Concern

Somewhat of
a Concern
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Significant
Concern

6. Based on the information provided, how credible did you perceive management to be?

Not at all
Credible

Very Credible

7. Based on the information provided, how experienced in financial reporting do you perceive
management to be?

Very Experienced

Not at all
Experienced

8. Based on the information provided, how much pressure do you believe is on management to
meet analysts’ EPS expectations?

A Great Deal

None

Please answer the following questions concerning characteristics of the audit firm. You may refer
back to the case information when responding. Place a slash anywhere on the line to indicate your
response.
Strongly Disagree

1. The audit firm has the technical knowledge needed to
complete this engagement.
2. The audit firm is independent in its relationship
with the company.
3. The audit firm is honest.
4. The audit firm lacks objectivity in its work
related to the company.
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Neutral

Strongly Agree

5. The audit firm is influenced by its financial
relationship with the client.
6. The audit firm has a great deal of experience.
7. The audit firm is biased when providing services
to the company.

Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Strongly Agree

8. I do not believe what the audit firm tells me.
9. The audit firm’s proposed adjustment can be
relied upon.
10. The audit firm is objective when providing
services to the company.
11. The audit firm’s work for the company should
not be relied upon.
12. The audit firm is independent of the company
management.
13. The audit firm lacks the expertise needed in this
engagement.
14. The audit firm has the ability to do the engagement.
Strongly Disagree

15. The audit firm is truthful.
16. I can rely on the audit firm when deciding if
the proposed adjustment should be recorded.
17. The audit firm provides unbiased services
to the company.
18. The audit firm can be pressured by management
to waive adjustments.
19. I trust the audit firm in this case.
20. I cannot rely on the adjustment proposed by the audit firm.
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Neutral

Strongly Agree

Please answer these questions without referring back to the case materials.
1. In this case, the audit firm has been conducting the AgPro audit for how many years? (circle
one):
a) 3 years
b) 10 years
2. In this case, the audit firm’s tenure (circle one):
a) is limited by a mandatory audit firm rotation requirement
b) is not limited by a mandatory audit firm rotation requirement
3. How realistic did you find the case? (Place a slash anywhere on the line below)

Not at All
Realistic

Very Realistic

4. How understandable did you find the case?

Not at All
Understandable

Very Understandable

5. How difficult did you find the case?

Not at All
Difficult

Very Difficult

6. In your role as an audit committee member, how much of a concern is the resignation of the
current audit firm, which would require you to find a replacement audit firm?

Not a Concern

Somewhat of a
Concern

Significant Concern

7. In your role as an audit committee member, how much of a concern is the replacement of the
audit firm if the current audit firm is dismissed by the audit committee?

Not a Concern

Somewhat of a
Concern
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Significant Concern

8. In your role as an audit committee member, how often do you consider replacing the audit
firm over accounting disagreements?

Never

Occasionally

Very Often

Please respond to the following demographic questions. These will be used only to analyze the
results, not to identify any participant.

1. Your age ___________
2. Your gender ___________
3. Highest educational degree (check one):
Bachelor’s _____

Masters

_____

JD

_____

PhD/DBA _____

4. Number of public company audit committees you currently serve

_____

5. Have any of the companies on whose audit committee you serve implemented a mandatory
audit firm rotation policy?
Yes _______ No ________
6. Approximate annual revenues of the largest public company on whose audit committee you
currently serve (check one):
< $250 million _____

501 million - $1 billion _____

$250-$500 million _____

> $ 1 billion _____

7. Total number of public company audit committees you have ever served

_____

8. Total number of years of public company audit committee experience

_____

9. Have you served, or are you currently serving, as an audit committee financial expert?
Yes _____

No _____

10. Are you a CPA?

Yes _____

No _____

Other professional certifications? Please list:
_______________________________________
11. Have you ever worked as an external auditor?

Yes _____

No ______

If Yes, how many years? __________
12. Have you ever worked as CEO, CFO, or in another top management position? Yes_____
No _____
If Yes, how many years? ____________
13. Current job title, if employed ________________________________________________
IF RETIRED, indicate the last full time job title
_________________________________________
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14. Primary industry in which you have employment or public company audit committee
experience:
__________________________________________________________________________
_____

If you have any additional comments, please provide them here:

Thank you for your participation. If you would like a copy of the study’s results, please
enclose a business card or email one of the researchers.
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